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THE EMPTINESS OF THE CONCEPT OF
JUS COGENS, AS ILLUSTRATED BY
THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
A. Mark Weisburd*
INTRODUCTION
In addition to the tremendous human suffering which it has pro-
duced, the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992 has had an impor-
tant impact upon international relations. This article examines one aspect
of this impact: the extent to which this war has highlighted the empti-
ness of the concept of jus cogens as applied in public international law.
Since at least some uses of force by international actors and some
acts in the course of war-making are said to violate rules of jus cogens,'
one would expect that at least the possibility of the violation of such
rules would arise whenever an armed conflict with any sort of interna-
tional character takes place. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, howev-
er, the problem is not simply that such violations have arguably taken
place, but that compliance with a rule of international law with consider-
able claim to jus cogens status apparently helped set off the conflict;
that the United States individually and the Security Council of the
United Nations collectively are actively promoting a formula for settling
the conflict that would seem to require acquiescence in acts violative of
norms supposed to be of jus cogens character; and that the ultimate
resolution of the issue may well require what amounts to toleration of
violation of still other rules widely believed to be part of jus cogens.
The aim of this article is neither to condemn departures from jus
cogens nor to engage in verbal gymnastics designed to obfuscate the
fact that the international community is treating or will treat "perempto-
ry norms" as moralisms irrelevant in practical terms. Rather, this article
seeks to show that the problem lies in the concept of jus cogens itself.
More specifically, the article intends to make the case that the concept is
intellectually indefensible - at best useless and at worst harmful in the
practical conduct of international relations.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. J.D., University of
Michigan (1976); A.B., Princeton University (1970). The author wishes to express his
appreciation for the support of the North Carolina Law Foundation in the preparation of this
article. He also wishes to thank Nicole Judkins for her valuable assistance.
1. See infra discussion at notes 125-59.
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The article first provides a brief history of developments in the
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It next addresses the history of the jus
cogens concept and discusses a few of the types of action constituting
violations of rules which have jus cogens status, if any do. Finally, the
article will both critique the concept of jus cogens and show how the
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates the problems with that con-
cept.
I. CHRONICLE OF THE FIGHTING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Disputes between several of the constituent republics of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the question of reshaping the federa-
tion's character led to the adoption, on September 27, 1990, by the
parliament of the republic of Slovenia, of a declaration that federal
Yugoslav legislation would no longer be applied within Slovenia.2 The
parliament of the republic of Croatia in the following December pro-
claimed that Croatian legislation would take precedence over federal
legislation within Croatia.3 Serbia, the largest of the republics and
dominant in the federation, took part in negotiations between the repub-
lics over the following months, but refused to agree to any new constitu-
tional arrangement which would have the effect of weakening its domi-
nance of Yugoslavia.4 The situation deteriorated to the point that, on
June 25, 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence
from Yugoslavia.i
The initial response of the Yugoslav federal military (JNA), begin-
ning on June 27, was to use force against Slbvenia.6 (It is important to
note, in this connection, that most of the JNA's officers and men were
ethnic Serbs, and that a large proportion of the ethnic Serb senior offi-
cers came from regions of Yugoslavia outside Serbia).7 Combined
efforts by the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Securi-
ty and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), facilitated by economic sanctions
imposed by the EC, led to a cease-fire agreement on July 7; by July 19,
JNA forces had been ordered to withdraw from Slovenia.8 However,
2. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
3. Id. at 569.
4. Id. at 569-70.
5. Id. at 570.
6. Id. at 570.
7. James Gow, One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, RFE/RL RES. REP., June 4,
1993, at 1, 4 [hereinafter One Year of War]; James Gow, The Remains of the Yugoslav
People's Army, 4 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV. 359 (Aug. 1992).
8. Weller, supra note 2, at 570-74.
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over this same period, fighting broke out in Croatia as forces subordi-
nate to the Croatian authorities came into conflict with Serbs living in
Croatia and with the JNA. 9
Over the next several months, as violence in Croatia increased, 0
representatives of the United Nations, the EC and the CSCE sought to
bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict." As a part of this
effort, the United Nations Security Council, in its Resolution 713, im-
posed an arms embargo on all parts of Yugoslavia. 2 The basis for the
invocation of the Council's mandatory powers under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter was the threat to Yugoslavia's neighbors posed
by the fighting; the Council did not, that is, purport to treat the conflict
as international.'
As of December, 1991, however, all efforts to end the fighting had
been unsuccessful. At that point, the differences in approach' between
Germany, on the one hand, and most of the rest of the EC, the United
States, and the UN Secretariat, on the other, came to a head. Convinced
that Serbia's behavior amounted to unlawful aggression, the German
government argued that the best course to pursue to end the fighting in
Yugoslavia was to extend formal diplomatic recognition to Croatia and
Slovenia. The German government maintained that the political support
for Croatia and Slovenia implied by such an act, reinforced by external
sanctions, would deter further Serbian actions. Conversely, a refusal to
recognize would signal to Serbia that it could continue its activities.
Germany's position was not based solely on the foregoing analysis. It
also derived from a German conviction that the Croatians and
Slovenians were entitled to exercise the right to self-determination.
Further, German officials apparently beiieved that recognition, by label-
ling Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, would make those
entities eligible for protection under the Charter of the United Nations;
their enjoyment of that status would deter the Serbs from further action,
it was thought, since the Serbs would fear exposing themselves to direct
action by the United Nations or the EC to aid the defense of sovereign
states facing an aggressor." Indeed, one authority has written:
9. Id. at 574.
10. Gow, One Year of War, supra note 7, at 4-7.
11. Weller, supra note 2, at 574-86.
12. Id. at 577-80.
13. Id.
14. Harald Miuller, Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate, in
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 125, 125-26 (Lawrence Freedman, ed.,
1994); Weller, supra note 2, at 587; John Eisenhammer, Germany Flexes Its Muscles on
Croatia's Behalf: John Eisenhammer Explains the Eagerness of Bonn to Recognize the
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For Germany, asserting the principles of the Paris Charter -
renunciation of the use of force, respect for the inviolability of
borders, and respect for human and minority rights - had an
importance that extended far beyond the Yugoslav case. This
consideration, above all else, explains the determination of the
German government to insist on its position despite U.S., UN, and
some European opposition."
Those opposing recognition of Croatia and Slovenia feared that, far
from helping to end the fighting, recognition in the absence of an over-
all settlement of the dispute would lead to greatly increased fighting; in
particular, there were fears that violence would spread to another of
Yugoslavia's constituent republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, still formally a
part of the federation. 16 Nonetheless, Germany was adamant. By mid-
December, it had made clear that it would recognize Croatia and
Slovenia regardless of the views of others.' 7 In the face of Germany's
position, the United Nations abandoned its efforts to discourage recogni-
tion, while the other members of the EC decided to preserve the unity of
their organization and join Germany in recognizing Slovenia and
Croatia, managing only to achieve the postponement of the formal
opening of diplomatic relations until January 15, 1992.18
It is appropriate to note at this point that, in the view of a number
of observers, those opposing the German policy on recognition were
correct. That is, according to this analysis, the combination of the recog-
nition of Slovene and Croatian independence and of the ethnically
diverse character of Bosnia-Herzegovina (its population is about 44%
Breakaway Republics Despite EC Reservations, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 19, 1991,
at 8; Stephen Engelberg, Yugoslav Ethnic Hatreds Raise Fears of A War Without End, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at Al; Blaine Harden, Balkans Entangle Big Powers Again: Germany,
U.S. Accused of Manipulating Rivalry for Their Own Gain, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1991, at
A9; Boris Johnson, Bonn Flexes Muscles and EC Caves In, DAILY TELEGRAPH, December 18,
1991, at 1. See generally Harald Miller, German Foreign Policy After Unification, in THE
NEW GERMANY AND THE NEW EUROPE 126, 153-54 (Paul B. Stares, ed., 1992) (discussing
reasons for Germany's recognition decision) [hereinafter German Foreign Policy].
15. German Foreign Policy, supra note 14, at 153 (footnote omitted).
16. Stephen Engelberg, Germany Raising Hopes of Croatia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991,
at A6; Johnson, supra note 14; Patrick Moore, Diplomatic Recognition. of Croatia and
Slovenia, RFEIRL RES. REP., Jan. 24, 1992, at 9, 12; Alan Philps, Yugoslavian Crisis: EC on
Collision Course with US over New Status of Republics, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
December 18, 1991, at 8.
17. John Tagliabue, Moving Defiantly on Yugoslavia, Bonn Threatens Rift with Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at Al.
18. Paul Lewis, UN Yields to Plans by Germany to Recognize Yugoslav Republics, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at A1; John Tagliabue, European Ties for Slovenia and Croatia, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, at A4.
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Muslim Slav, 33% Serb, and 18% Croatian) 9 made fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina inevitable. On the one hand, the Muslims would be unwill-
ing to remain a part of a Yugoslavia that would, absent Croatia and
Slovenia, necessarily be subject to even more Serb domination than had
been the case prior to the secession of those two republics. Yet, the
Bosnian Serbs would be strongly resistant to any arrangement that
eliminated their ties to Serbia and placed them within a state likely to be
dominated by a Muslim plurality. They, along with the Bosnian Croats,
would strongly prefer an arrangement whereby the areas they inhabited
formed part of an ethnic homeland, if federal Yugoslavia were to cease
to exist. Further, the governments of both Croatia and Serbia would seek
to incorporate within their own territories those portions of Bosnia-
Herzegovina inhabited by their co-ethnics.20
To return to the narrative, on December 20, 1991, Bosnia-
Herzegovina joined Slovenia and Croatia in seeking recognition from
the EC states; but its request was denied in view of uncertainty about
the views of the ethnic Serbs Within its territory. A referendum to
determine popular views on the question was accordingly held on March
1, 1992. Although the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of indepen-
dence, the results did not reflect the views of the Bosnian Serbs, who
had boycotted the balloting. Nonetheless, the EC elected to recognize
Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1992.21 The United States did the same
the next day. 22 Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted to the United Nations,
along with Croatia and Slovenia, on May 22, 1992.23
While these events were unfolding, violence had begun in Bosnia-
Herzegovina amounting to a state of war by March 1992.24 The fighting
pitted Serbs resident in Bosnia-Herzegovina, supported by the JNA,
against poorly armed forces of the republic's government. 25 The govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) - a rump state
formed on April 27, 1992, by the two constitutent republics of the
original Yugoslavia which had not yet seceded26 - purported, on May
19. Patrick Moore, The International Relations of the Yugoslav Area, REF/RL RES. REP.,
May 1, 1992, at 33-34.
20. Misha Glenny, Yugoslavia: The Great Fall, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 1995, at
56-57, 61-62; Moore, supra note 19, at 34; Warren Zimmermann, The Last Ambassador: A
Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr., 1995, at 1, 15-17.
21. Weller, supra note 2, at 591-93.
22. 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 1992, at 331.
23. G.A. Res. 46/237, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/237 (1992).
24. One Year of War, supra note 7, at 7.
25. Id at 7-10.
26. Weller, supra note 2, at 595.
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5, 1992, to turn over control of JNA units serving in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to the Bosnian Serb authorities.27 However, there was
evidence that considerable contact continued to take place between FRY
and Bosnian Serb forces, and that units of the JNA continued to fight in
Bosnia-Herzegovina after May 1992.28 Indeed, reports of continuing
close ties between FRY forces and the Bosnian Serbs' troops appeared
as late as June 1995,29 even though the government of the FRY claimed
to have cut off all political and economic aid to the Bosnian Serbs in
August 1994.30 The Bosnian Serbs, thus supported by the JNA, enjoyed
considerable success: as of the end of 1994, they controlled approxi-
mately 70% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3'
This situation changed in the summer of 1995. After a three-day
offensive in early August, the Croatian Army routed Croatian Serb
forces which had been holding the Krajina region of Croatia, adjacent to
northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina.32 The Croatian forces continued their
advance into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, cooperating with the
forces of that state in attacking areas held by the Bosnian Serbs; the
Croatian/Bosnia-Herzegovinan combined forces made considerable
progress, taking from the Bosnian Serbs about 20% of the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus shifting the balance of territorial control in
that state from a 70-30 division favoring the Bosnian Serbs to an ap-
proximately equal division between the Bosnian Serbs and the
Croatian/Bosnia-Herzegovinan forces.33
Bosnia-Herzegovina has thus seen considerable fighting. This fight-
ing, moreover, has been of a very brutal character. While claims by the
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina that 200,000 of its citizens have
been killed are disputed, even the more recent calculations suggesting
that the death toll for all the contending parties is more likely in the
27. Chuck Sudetic, Forces in Bosnia Begin to Unravel, N.Y. TIMEs, May 6, 1992, at
A 16.
28. One Year of War, supra note 7, at 3-4, 7-10; Jonathan S. Landay, Yugoslav Army
Troops Active Inside Bosnia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 1994, at 1.
29. Stephen Engelberg and Eric Schmitt, Western Officials Say Serbia Helps Bosnian
Comrades, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at Al, A14.
30. Chuck Sudetic, Serbia Isolating Allies in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at Al.
31. James Gow, To Win on Points-Stalemate in Bosnia, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV.
Y.B. 1994, at 54, 54-57.
32. Raymond Bonner, Croatia Declares Victory in Rebel Area, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1995, at A6.
33. Chris Hedges, Extent of Croat-Bosnia Advance Threatens U.S.-Brokered Peace, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at Al.
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25,000-60,000 range3 4 reach a figure representing 0.5%-1.5% of the
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 5 It must be stressed that many of the
dead are non-combatants, and there is also considerable evidence that
numerous and massive violations of humanitarian norms have taken
place, including arbitrary killings, rape, torture, and -'most notoriously
- so-called ethnic cleansing, wherein troops of one ethnic group induce
members of a rival group to abandon particular territory through the use
of arbitrary killing and other forms of terror.3 6 Some observers have
concluded that the Bosnian. Muslims have been victims of genocide,
though this conclusion is not universally shared.37 Further, it appears
that by far the majority of these acts are the responsibility of the Serbian
side.38
The international response to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina has
followed three tracks. First, under the auspices of the United Nations, the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) originally assigned to
peace-keeping duty in Croatia, has also taken up responsibilities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its mission has been defined as providing protection
for deliveries of relief supplies to civilian populations, providing security
for so-called "safe areas" established by the Security Council for the
protection of non-combatants, and guarding depositories of heavy weap-
ons turned over to UNPROFOR by the combatants.39 The consensus as
of the mid-summer of 1995 was that UNPROFOR's performance had
been mixed. It had had some limited success in delivering relief supplies
but had been ineffective in protecting safe areas or in controlling heavy
weapons; indeed, it appeared that the vulnerability of the UNPROFOR
troops to retaliation at the hands of Bosnian Serbs limited the willingness
of third states to adopt a more vigorous policy of protecting safe areas
34. George Kenney, The Bosnian Calculation, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1995, §6 (Maga-
zine), at 42.
35. Weller, supra note 2, at 569.
36. Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of Yugoslavia and the
Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 385, 391-92 (1993); One
Year of War, supra note 7, at 8; Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, at
33-37, 70-72, 84 n.87, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report].
37. Compare Anderson, supra note 36 at 392-94 with Final Report, supra note 36, at
37-43.
38. Anderson, supra note 36, at 391; Final Report, supra note 36, at 70-72.
39. G.A. Res. 46/242, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/242 (1992); S.C.
Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993); S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/REs/770 (1992); Letter from President William J. Clinton to the Speaker of the House and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Aug. 22, 1994), in 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Aug.
29, 1994, at 581. See generally S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRES/743
(1992) (establishing UNPROFOR).
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and controlling the combatants' access to heavy weapons. In light of the
danger to the peace-keeping forces and UNPROFOR's relatively modest
accomplishments, some observers had begun to suggest that the force
should be withdrawn. 40
By late August 1995, the role of third state forces in the fighting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina changed profoundly. After a shelling in Sarajevo
killed a number of civilians, NATO aircraft began retaliatory airstrikes
against Bosnian Serb targets, while French and British artillery units,
which formed part of the newly organized United Nations' Rapid Reac-
tion Force, shelled Bosnian Serb positions. 41 After several weeks of
NATO/UN bombing and shelling, and in the face of the Croatian/Bosnia-
Herzegovinan military advances described above, the Bosnian Serbs
agreed in September 1995 to withdraw their heavy weapons from the
Sarajevo area and to permit the reopening both of the airport and of land
routes into the city.42 When the contending sides agreed upon a cease-fire
in the conflict as discussed below, NATO was expected to provide as
many as 70,000 troops, under UN authority, to oversee that cease-fire.43
Aside from the dispatch of troops, a second response of the interna-
tional community has been the establishment by the Security Council of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (Tribunal)44 and the adoption of a
Statute for the governance of that body.45 The functions of the Tribunal
40. See Bruce B. Auster, et al., Lost in the Balkan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 12,
1995, at 34; George J. Church, The Serbs Respond to NATO Bombings by Chaining Hostages
Near Potential Targets, and the Stalemate Resumes, TIME, June 5, 1995, at 38; Roger Cohen,
As Usual, Serbs Call The Shots, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1995, at A6; Michael R. Gordon, U.S.
and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al; Chris Hedges, Bosnian
Serbs Overrun Town Protected by U.N., N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 1995, at Al; Bruce W. Nelan,
Despite NATO Bluster, Peacekeeping Reinforcements Won't Change a Thing, TIME, June 19,
1995, at 29; Eric Schmitt, U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the
Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1995, at A6; Unprofitable UNPROFOR, THE ECONOMIST, June
24, 1995 (U.S. ed.), at 46. See generally Anthony Lewis, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the
Failure of the West, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 20, 1995, at 29 (book review) (arguing that
UNPROFOR lacks effectiveness).
41. Roger Cohen, Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo: US Urges NATO to Strike Serbs,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at AI; Roger Cohen, NATO Jets Attack Serbian Positions Around
Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al.
42. Roger Cohen, Bosnian Serbs Agree to Pull Back Heavy Artillery From Sarajevo, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at Al.
43. Eric Schmitt, NATO Force Endorsed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1995, at A4.
44. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
45. The Statute of the Tribunal appears as an annex to Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
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are obvious from its title. Its subject matter jurisdiction extends to grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 46 The Tribunal
is not authorized to take any action solely on the basis of evidence that
an act of aggression has been committed. The Tribunal has indicted both
the political head and the military commander of the Bosnian Serbs,
accusing both of committing extremely serious crimes falling within the
Tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction.47
Finally, various international efforts have been undertaken to negoti-
ate an end to 'the fighting. In 1994, the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany - the so-called Control Group -
proposed a plan according to which 51% of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina would fall under the authority of the government of that
state, while 49% would be governed by Bosnian Serb authorities. Two
years after the plan was implemented, the Serb-administered areas would
be permitted to hold a referendum on whether to secede from Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 8 This plan was endorsed by.the Security Council, which
imposed sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs for their refusal to accept the
plan.49 At last, in early September 1995, after the NATO bombing and
the Croatian/Bosnia-Herzegovinan military advances described above,
and after the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to permit President Milosevic of
Serbia to control negotiations on their behalf, the parties accepted a plan
proposed by the United States generally in line with the Control Group
Plan. Under this approach, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided into
two entities, one primarily Muslim and Croatian and controlling 51% of
the state's territory, the other primarily Serbian and controlling the
remaining 49%.50 Although the plan envisioned preserving the unity of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and creating common institutions linking the two
entities within it, as of this writing, the nature of such institutions had
not been decided and no means of preventing the Bosnian Serb entity
from seceding from Bosnia-Herzegovina and uniting with Serbia had
been established." Subsequently, in early October, the parties, again at
46. Id. at arts. 2-5.
47. Marlise Simons, U.N. Tribunal Indicts Bosnian Serb Leader an d a Commander, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A9.
48. Edward Luce, et al., A Last Effort at Mediation Amid Pessimism and Bluff, THE
GUARDIAN, July 6, 1994, at 12.
49. S.C. Res. 942, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/942 (1994).
50. Roger Cohen, Serb Shift Opens Chance For Peace, A U.S. Envoy Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1995, at Al; Elaine Sciolino, Enemies in Bosnia Devise Structure For A Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at Al.
51. Sciolino, supra note 50.
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the urging of the United States, agreed to a cease-fire in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, during the course of which peace talks were to take place.52
That cease-fire actually went into effect on October 12."
As of this writing, then, there is some hope of ending the fighting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The possibility of ending this war has been created
in part by the military successes of the Croatian/Bosnia-Herzegovinan
forces, in part because of the willingness of NATO governments to
finally use significant force, against the Bosnian Serbs, and in part
because of American diplomatic efforts. It must be stressed, however,
that the price'of the peace plan being considered would be the-effective
legitimation of the acquisition by the Bosnian Serbs of nearly half the
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the use of force.
II. THE CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Development of the Concept
The term jus cogens is applied to "certain overriding principles of
international law."54 According to Brownlie, "[t]he major distinguishing
feature of such rules is their relative indelibility. They are rules of
customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence
.... ,55 It seems clear that the term "jus cogens" was not employed in
connection with international law until this century,56 though Hannikainen
has argued that certain rules of international law in fact had come to
meet Brownlie's criteria forjus cogens in earlier periods. In any case,
it appears that the systematic development of the concept began after
World War I.
At that time, the idea of an international jus cogens began to be
advanced by certain publicists of international law.5 Initially, it was
discussed only in connection with the law of treaties. In 1937, Verdross
insisted that there were two types of norms having the character of jus
52. Alison Mitchell, Bosnian Enemies Set A Cease-Fire, Plan Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1995, at Al.
53. Kit R. Roane, Bosnia Cease-Fire Goes Into Effect As Pact Is Signed, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1995, at AI.
54. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (3d ed., 1979).
55. Id.
56. See JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 12-54 (1974).
57. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS [Jus COGENS] IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 14 (1988).
58. See George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Jus Cogens: Root & Branch (An Inventory), 3 TOURO
L. REV. 203, 207-12 (1987).
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cogens in international law; states were simply not free to conclude
treaties Violating these norms.59 The first of these categories included
discrete rules that had become compulsory; as an example, Verdross
suggested the prohibition on states disturbing other states in the use of
the high seas. 60 The second category included rules that were contra bon
mores. 6 Verdross gave two arguments supporting the existence of this
second category of jus cogens norms. He noted that such prohibitions on
agreements were "common to the juridical orders of all civilized
states," 62 and argued that the principle was therefore part of international
law as a general principle of law recognized by civilized states, within
the meaning of Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.63 He acknowledged that such principles were
normally considered subsidiary to rules of customary international law
and to treaties, but argued that this concept of subsidiarity could not
apply to compulsory norms.64
Verdross's second argument was that "[n]o juridical order can...
admit treaties between juridical subjects, which are obviously in contra-
diction to the ethics of a certain community. 65 He argued that four types
of treaties would be immoral and therefore void: treaties which would
have the effect of denying a state the ability to protect the lives and
property of persons in its territory, as by requiring excessive reductions
of its police force; treaties requiring arms reductions to the point that a
state was rendered defenseless; treaties requiring a state to expose its
population to distress, as by closing hospitals; and treaties forbidding a
state to protect its nationals abroad.66 With respect to examples of his
* third category of immoral treaties, Verdross. observed:
These examples prove in a particularly obvious way ihe absurd
consequences of that pseudo-positivisitic doctrine which denies the
prohibition of immoral treaties in international law .... A truly
realistic analysis of the law shows us that every positive juridical
order has its roots in the ethics of a certain community, that it
cannot be understood apart from its moral basis.
67





63. Id. at 573. The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice is now the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 572.
66. Id at 574-76.
67. Id. at 576.
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Verdross was somewhat vague on the consequences of the conclusion
of an immoral treaty. To be sure, he argued that any tribunal before
which such a treaty was considered was obliged to treat it as void,
regardless of the arguments of the parties.' He also argued that, in the
event that a dispute arose between the parties to such a treaty which
could not be taken before a tribunal, it could be addressed by the Council
of the League of Nations, if both parties were members of the League. 69
Verdross had no suggestions as to methods of dealing with such treaties
if neither of those alternatives was available, and made no reference to
any rights of states not parties to an immoral treaty to react to it.
After World War II, the concept of jus cogens continued to receive
attention. Kelsen, for example, addressed the subject, though with
considerably less certainty than Verdross. He asserted that, "[n]o clear
answer... can be found in the traditional theory of international law" to
the question whether jus cogens norms exist in international law.70 He
stated that it was "probable that a treaty by which two or more states
release one another from the obligations imposed upon them by the norm
of general international law prohibiting occupation of parts of the open
sea" would be declared void by an international tribunal,7' but rejected
the idea that states could not reciprocally renounce their respective rights
of extending diplomatic protection to their own citizens.72 This last, of
course, was the fourth of Verdross's categories of immoral treaties.
In 1953, the issue ceased to be solely a matter of academic discus-
sion. In that year, in his capacity as special rapporteur of the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) on the law of treaties, Lauterpacht sub-
mitted to the ILC a partial draft convention on the law of treaties. Its
Article 15 provided, "[a] treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its
performance involves an act which is illegal under international law and
if it is declared so to be by the International Court of Justice. 73 In his
commentary on this article, Lauterpacht observed that "in principle,
States are free to modify by treaty, as between themselves, the rules of
customary international law."'74 He went on to give examples of rules he
believed states were free to alter as between themselves; included among
68. Id. at 577.
69. Id.
70. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1952).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Hersch Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953),
reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.I.
74. Id. at 154.
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them were rules governing the breadth of their territorial seas, the
prohibition upon navies interfering with merchant vessels of states other
than their own upon the high seas, and the prohibition upon nationalizing
property of foreign nationals without compensation. 75 Lauterpacht then
observed:
It would thus appear that the test whether the object of the
treaty is illegal and whether the treaty is void for that reason is not
inconsistency with customary international law pure and simple, but
inconsistency with such overriding principles of international law
which may be regarded as constituting principles of international
public policy (ordre international public). These principles need not
necessarily have crystallized in a clearly accepted rule of law such
as prohibition of piracy or of aggressive war. They may be expres-
sive of rules of international morality so cogent that an international
tribunal would consider them as forming part of those principles of
law generally recognized by civilized nations which the Internation-
al Court of Justice is bound to apply by Article 38(3) of its Statute
The voidance of contractual agreements whose object is illegal
is a general principle of law. As such it must find a place in a
codification of the law of treaties.76
Although Lauterpacht acknowledged that there were no decisions of
international tribunals supporting the voiding of treaties on the basis
suggested in his Article 15,77 he observed that it was "generally - if not
universally - admitted by writers. ' He apparently considered Article
15 lex lata, since he made clear that he regarded his draft as generally a
statement of existing law. Though he thought it important to indicate
clearly when his draft departed from existing law,79 he gave no such
indication in connection with Article 15. Indeed, in a note to his com-
ment, he stressed one difficulty created by what he saw as this existing
limitation on states' freedom to agree:
[I]f, as stated in the present article, international courts are to be
judges of the validity of treaties in the light of overriding principles
of international custom and international public policy as hitherto
recognized, a situation may be created in which international society
may be deprived of the necessary means of development through
processes of international legislation."
75. Id.
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id.
78. 1l at 154.
79. Id. at 90.
80. Id at 155.
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Lauterpacht made clear that he meant the term "international legisla-
tion" to include bilateral and multilateral treaties. 81 He went on to
suggest that it might be advisable de lege ferenda to permit "a multilat-
eral treaty concluded in the general international interest" to depart from
"an overriding rule of customary international law. 82 He also indicated
that he did not see Article 15 as making "consistency with international
morality" simpliciter a condition for the validity of a treaty, but only
consistency with such considerations of morality as formed "a constituent
part of general principles of law and of the requirements of international
public policy.
83
In its stress upon rules of public policy "not necessarily crystallized
in a clearly accepted rule of law" and his reliance on "general principles
of law" to support his conclusion, Lauterpacht's formulation resembles
that of Verdross. Lauterpacht's successors as rapporteurs on the law of
treaties relied on similar concepts: Fitzmaurice making reference to
"considerations of morals and international good order which are jus
cogens rules" 84 and Waldock to the idea of "international public order."8 5
By 1966, however, the ILC had moved away from this type of thinking
on the subject. Bythis time', the draft language of the renumbered article
on jus cogens was as follows:
Article 50. Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general
international law (jus cogens)
A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character. 86
In its comment on this article, the ILC explained that "[a]s a modifi-
cation of a rule of jus cogens would to-day most probably be effected
through a general multilateral treaty, the Commission thought it desirable
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 155-56.
84. Gerald Fitzmaurice, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115
(1958), reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20, 27-28, 40-41, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/195 8/Add. 1.
85. Humphrey Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156
(1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 36, 52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add. 1.
86. Report of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth
session and on its eighteenth session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.I [hereinafter 1966 ILC
Report].
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to indicate that such a treaty would fall outside the scope of the arti-
cle."87 .This language clearly assumes that states are free to change jus
cogens, at least when they use the mechanism of a general multilateral
treaty to do so. The assumption that the content of jus cogens is under
the control of states is likewise implied by the Commission's statement
that it planned to leave the full content of jus cogens "to be worked out
in state practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.""8
This approach to jus cogens differs from Lauterpacht's apparent assump-
tion that the content of the body of "international public policy" was
something to be applied by tribunals but was essentially unmodifiable by
governments.
This more positivistic approach to jus cogens, was reinforced by the
deliberations of state representatives at the Vienna Conference on the
Law of Treaties. Greece, joined by Spain and Finland, offered an
amendment to Article 50 which proposed inserting the words "recognized
by the international community as a norm" after the words "general
international law."89 The incumbent special rapporteur, Sir Humphrey
Waldock, took the position that Article 50 as drafted had the same effect
as the amendment, since "a general rule of international law necessarily
implied general recognition by the international community"; he none-
theless supported consideration of the amendment as making the text of
the article clearer.90 Meeting in the Committee of the Whole, the confer-
ence voted to refer the amendment to the Drafting Committee, 9' which
"decided the amendment ... would clarify the text"92 and incorporated
it, slightly modified, into Article 50. As redrafted, Article 50 read:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
93
87. Id. at 248.
88. Id.
89. Documents of the Conference 174, Official Records, United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.2 (1971).
90. Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of
the Whole 328, Official Records, 1st Sess., United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969).
91. Id. at 333.
92. Id at 471.
93. Id.
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As amended, -the Committee of the Whole approved the text of Article
50 by a vote of 72-3-18.94 The conference gave final approval to the
Article by a vote of 87-8-12. 95 The net effect of the consideration of jus
cogens by the Vienna Conference, then, was to underline the view of the
states present that a norm's character as jus cogens depended upon its
acceptance by states.
Both the ILC and the states represented at the Vienna Conference
addressed in addition the issue of the content of jus cogens. The ILC, in
its commentary to draft Article 50, characterized "the law of the Charter
concerning the prohibition of the use of force" as "a conspicuous exam-
ple of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens,"
96
but ultimately decided not to include examples of jus cogens norms in
the article in order to avoid both "misunderstanding as to the position
concerning other cases not mentioned in the article"97 and "prolonged
study of matters which fall outside the scope of the present articles. ' 98
The Vienna Conference did not alter the text of Article 50 in this regard,
but a number of state delegations also suggested a number of candidates
for jus cogens status, including not only the prohibition of the use of
force but also such rules as the right to self-determination, human rights
norms, rules of humanitarian law in warfare, and prohibitions of geno-
cide, racial discrimination, and unequal treaties (different states referred
to different norms and no norm was mentioned by all states addressing
the issue).99
One aspect of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vi-
enna Convention") requires comment. Draft Article 50, codified in the
Vienna Convention as Article 53, falls within a section of the Vienna
Convention titled "Invalidity of Treaties."' ° Article 65 of the Vienna
Convention - the section on the procedure to be followed for terminat-
ing or suspending a treaty - is titled "Procedure to be Followed with
Respect to Invalidity, Termination, Withdrawal from or Suspension of the
Operation of a Treaty."'' That is, Article 65 is apparently intended to
govern when a treaty is challenged as falling under one of the Vienna
94. Id. at 472.
95. Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of
the Whole 106-07, Official Records, 2d Sess., United Nations Conference on the Law of Treat-
ies, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 I/Add.1 (1970).
96. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 86, at 247.
97. Id. at 248.
98. Id.
99. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 119-20.
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, pt. V, § 2, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
101. Id., art. 65 (emphasis added).
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Convention's grounds of invalidity, which would include Article 53. This
is significant because the procedure created under Article 65 is available
only to parties to the treaty whose invalidity, termination, etc., is in
question. This is apparent from both the language of the article' 2 and
from the ILC's commentary on it.' °3 Writers who have carefully studied
the matter have also concluded that the only states entitled under the
Vienna Convention to challenge a treaty as violating a jus cogens norm
are those which are parties to the treaty in question." That is, even
though the idea which culminated in Article 53 arose from a concern
with treaties violating international public policy or international morali-
ty, the Vienna Convention creates no right in states generally to chal-
lenge a treatyalleged to violate Article 53. The obligation embodied in
Article 53, then, cannot be characterized as erga omnes.
The development of the jus cogens concept since 1969 has been
rather modest. Treaty developments relevant to this subject have included
the adherence of seventy-six states to the Vienna Convention, 5 those
states presumably accepting that convention's definition of jus cogens.
The ILC likewise continues to see that definition as authoritative in its
dealings with treaties; thus the draft Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations ("Convention on International Organization Treaties")
repeated the language of Article 53 almost verbatim.' 6 In particular, the
ILC commentary observed, with respect to the continued use of the
phrase "recognized and accepted by the international community of states
as a whole" that "in the present state of international law, it is states that
are called upon to establish or recognize peremptory norms."'07 This
language was retained in the final text of the convention.'08
. State practice regarding jus cogens has been quite limited. A number
of international organizations have condemned as unlawful, apparently
because contrary to jus cogens, certain agreements and acts by states.
102. "A party which ... invokes... a ground for impeaching the validity of a treaty...
must notify the other parties of its claim." Id.
103. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 86, at 262-63.
104. Hannikainen, supra note 57, at 294; Giorgio Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna
Convention, 172 R.C.A.D.I. 271, 282-83 (1981); CHRIsTos L. RoZAlus, THE CONCEPT OF Jus
COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 115-19 (1976); SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 125-29.
105. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 Decem-
ber 1994 887, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13 (1995).
106. Report of the International Law Commission 117, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982).
107. Id. at 118.
108. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, arts. 53, 65, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 129/15, 25 I.L.M. 543, 572, 577 (1986).
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However, with the possible exception of the. response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, there have been no efforts by the international community to
reverse the effects of alleged violations of jus cogens or to ensure that
offending states compensated their victims. 1°9 Nor - with one excep-
tion110 - have international tribunals squarely relied on jus cogens in
deciding cases, though they have on occasion phrased opinions in such
a way as to hint at their approval of the concept."'
One area in which there has been considerable activity with respect
to jus cogens, however, is that of doctrine. For purposes of this discus-
sion, the most significant aspect of this doctrinal development is the
assertion in some quarters that jus cogens is relevant to customary
international law as well as to the law of treaties. For example, the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
takes the position that rules of jus cogens "prevail over and invalidate
international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict
with them.""' 2 Further, the ILC drew a connection between the category
of jus cogens norms and the concept of international crimes embodied in
Article 19 of its draft articles on state responsibility - and the concept
of international crimes necessarily applies to acts not connected to
treaties.1 3 A number of writers have also asserted that jus cogens has




It is not easy to determine what it means to say that jus cogens
applies to rules of customary international law as well as to treaties.
As Sztucki points out, if a unilateral act is a violation of a norm of
customary international law, it is difficult to see what difference it
makes to further characterize the violated norm as "peremptory,"
since state responsibility exists in any case. If it is argued that the
difference lies in the nullity and voidness of the act, he further notes,
109. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to Internation-
al Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 605-08 (1988); Hannikainen, supra note 57, at 185-91,
301-11.
110. Resolution No. 3/87, Case No. 9647 (United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.
LIVII.69, doc. 17 (1987).
111. Christenson, supra note 109, at 605-08; Hannikainen, supra note 57, at 192-94;
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 100-01 (June 27).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k (1986) (emphasis
added) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
113. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n II 98-116, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.4/1976/Add. I (Part 2) [hereinafter 1976 ILC Report].
114. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 109, at 585-86, 611-14; Mark W. Janis, The
Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 362 (1988); Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon,
Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411,
417-19 (1989); sources collected in Sztucki, supra note 56, at 66.
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the label applied to the violated norm does not affect the practicality
of reversing the challenged act. 115
Arguably, however, one could imagine one concrete effect of label-
ling a rule of customary international law as a jus cogens norm: such a
categorization would mean that practice contrary to the norm in question
could not have the effect of changing the norm. It is, of course, a com-
monplace that practice contrary to a rule of customary international law
- which is necessarily a violation of that rule as an initial matter - can
ultimately lead to a change in the content of that rule." l6 If, however, a
customary rule is-one of jus cogens, then - to use the language.of Arti-
cle 53 of the Vienna Convention. - no derogation from the rule is per-
mitted. Presumably that would. mean that acts contrary to the rule are
nullities in all respects, and thus cannot affect.the content of customary
international law, either by undermining an existing rule or by serving as
the basis of a new rule. A number of writers have asserted that this is in
fact the effect of jus cogens concepts on customary law."
7
Necessarily, this delinking of the content of jus cogens and state
practice raises questions as to the source of jus cogens, and some writers
have been willing to take the next logical step and assert that the idea of
jus cogens makes sense only if thatbody of norms is seen as a matter of
natural law."18 Indeed, even writers who generally disparage the natural
law approach to international legal questions have been willing to rely on
natural law arguments as a basis forjus cogens."9
.;It should be stressed that this natural law view ofjus cogens is.by no
means universal among writers. Rozakis argues that a rule of general
customary law, coming into existence through the usual process of devel-
opment of customary law, can have the effect of changing a customary
rule that had the character of jus cogens.120 Similarly, Gaja argues that,
"[iut would be of little use, and theoretically questionable, to assert the
existence of a norm of international law which does not effectively regu-
late the conduct of States."' 2' And Hannikainen considers customary law
115. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 68-69.
116. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-98
(1971); Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11-20 (1988).
117. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 109, at 611-14; Parker and Neylon, supra note
114, at 418-19.
118. INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 174-76 (1994); Janis, supra
note 114, at 360-63; Parker and Neylon, supra note 114, at 419-22.
119. Compare MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, AND LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 68-71 (1980) with id. at 339-42.
120. Rozakis, supra note 104, at 89-91.
121. Gaja, supra note 104, at 286.
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to be the primary source of jus cogens norms, though his approach to
determining the content of customary law relies heavily on the resolu-
tions of international organizations 122 and thus raises theoretical difficul-
ties.
121
It is clear, then, that there are fundamental differences among writers
regarding the core of the concept of jus cogens, echoing the differences
between the approach to the subject in the Vienna Convention and that
taken in, for example, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. As will
be discussed in greater detail below, 24 this divergence in view has
important implications for the role that the jus cogens concept can
usefully play in international relations.
122. Hannikainen, supra note 571 at 225-47.
123. Hannikainen asserts:
[T]here exists in the Western world a critical doctrine stating that it should be
recognized that elements of political expediency are regularly present in the voting
of States in international organizations. The tendency of this criticism is to minimize
the legal significancy of resolutions of international organizations.
In the face of developments of recent decades this critical view is difficult to
sustain .... Among the resolutions of the GA and SC there can be found elements
of expediency and political motivation, but there are also many resolutions which
use normative language and indicate the unanimity or general agreement of UN
members on a given legal question. If such resolutions are adopted with consistency
by a number of international organs or repeatedly by one organ, it is difficult to
deny that they are evidence of the practice and the opinio juris of those States
which vote for those resolutions.
Id., at 233 (footnotes omitted). This proposition does not seem at all difficult to deny. Suppose
it can be demonstrated that State practice with respect to a particular subject is quite different
from what one would expect if one consulted resolutions adopted by international organiza-
tions, which resolutions used normative language, were adopted unanimously, and took a
consistent position over time. At least one could make a respectable argument that the
resolutions, as they did not reflect State practice, were simply irrelevant to the content of
customary international law. See Anthony A. D'Amato, Trashing Customary Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 101, 101-05 (1987).
Hannikainen also attempts to analogize the "political" character of resolutions of
international organizations to the political character of acts of domestic legislatures.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 233 n.98. But the analogy fails, as it depends on two differ-
ent senses of the word "political." As used with respect to international organizations,
"political" means that states are acting with reference only to the particular issue before the
body, and are not, in fact applying principles that they would either apply in another similar
case with different political stakes or adhere to themselves in practice. Since resolutions of
international organizations are relevant to customary international law only to the extent that
they in fact represent the practice of states, to label such a resolution "political" is to indicate
that it does not necessarily represent the practice of those voting for it, and thus is irrelevant
for purposes of determining the content of customary law. While domestic legislatures may act
from all manner of reasons of political expediency, the legal effect of their actions depends
simply on the fact of their authority within a given system. That legal effect does not depend
on legislative actions somehow evidencing practice outside the legislature. Since a legislature's
authority depends on formal sources, legislative hypocrisy has no legal effect on legislative
action. But if states are hypocritical in voting in international organizations, they deprive their
votes of legal effect, since such legal effect can exist in any case only to the extent the votes
reflect the actual practice of the states whose representatives are doing the voting.
124. See infra discussion at notes 168-76.
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B.. Content of Jus Cogens
The foregoing provides some background as to the evolution of the
jus cogens concept, but leaves open a question that is central to this
discussion: what are the norms falling within the category of jus cogens
which might be relevant to the subject of this paper?
Addressing this topic requires confronting an aspect of the concept
of jus cogens which seems somewhat anomalous: as Brownlie has
observed, "more authority 'exists for the category of jus cogens than
exists for its particular content."'125 Certainly, scholars' concepts of the
list of jus cogens norms have changed over the decades.
For example, as mentioned above, 126 Verdross included among his
list of jus cogens norms the freedom of the seas and prohibitions on
treaties which obliged a state to forego extending diplomatic protection
to its nationals abroad or which rendered a state defenseless. As an
example of the last, he apparently had in mind the treaty imposed on
Austria after World War I, requiring the disarmament of that state.
127
Kelsen apparently agreed with Verdross regarding freedom of the seas,
but not with respect to a prohibition upon waivers of the right to extend
diplomatic protection. 2 And Lauterpacht apparently saw both rights as
at least partially waivable.129 Not only have later writers thus questioned
Verdross's views regarding the content of jus cogens, but those views
seem inconsistent with the development of international law. For exam-
ple, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has surely
qualified many aspects of what Verdross would have called the freedom
of the seas.' 3° Further, it seems unlikely that requiring a particular state
to disarm would be viewed today as unthinkable, given the powers
accorded the Security Council eight years after Verdross wrote. But
Verdross' 1937 views are hardly the only suggestions for jus cogens
norms which have been made over the years that would seem suspect in
1995. Professor Schwelb even offered the example of a writer who, prior
to World War II, argued that jus cogens forbade a state to surrender one
of its nationals for war crimes trials, but who wrote after the war that the
crimes described in the London Declaration had become a matter of jus
125. Brownlie, supra note 54, at 515..
126. See discussion supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
127. Verdross, supra note 59, at 575 n.12.
128. See discussion supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
129. See discussion supra note 75.
130. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 55, 57, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1280 (1982) (regime and breadth of exclusive economic
zone).
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cogens.13l Sztucki has compiled an extensive catalog of writers' and
governments' differing views as to the content of jus cogens.
132
Keeping in mind this tendency for understandings as to the particular
content of jus cogens to differ and to change over time, it is nonetheless
fair to say that contemporary scholars have come to some agreement on
the subject. There seems to be little dispute among those supporting the
existence of jus cogens norms that the rule embodied in Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter, forbidding the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of a member of the
United Nations, is a peremptory norm. As noted above, 133 the ILC took
this position in its commentary to the draft articles on the law of treaties,
as did a number of states at the Vienna Conference. The ILC reiterated
this view in its commentary to its draft articles on state responsibility.134
Writers, including Brownlie, 135 Crawford, 136 Sinclair, 1
37 and Whiteman, 138
take the ,same position. Hannikainen concurs, though he acknowledges
that states have not in practice consistently refused to recognize either
authority over territory seized by force or governments installed in one
state through the use of force by another. 139 It should be noted, however,
that the dimensions even of this rule are not entirely clear since -
though there is much dispute on this point' 4 - at least a few writers
would read into Article 2(4) an exception for forcible interventions in a
state to protect that state's nationals from serious human rights violations
perpetrated by the state's government. 14
A second norm having the character of jus cogens, according to a
number of authorities, is the prohibition on genocide. The ILC took this
position in its comments on Draft Article 50 to the Vienna Convention
131. Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the
International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 967-68 (1967).
132. Sztucki, supra note 56, at 76-84, 114-23.
133. See discussion supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
134. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 113, at 102-06.
135. Brownlie, supra note 54, at 513,515.
136. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-07
(1979).
137. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 222-23 (2d ed.
1984).
138. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, with a Projected List, 7
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 625 (1977).
139. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 317-56.
140. Id. at 336-37.
141. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TtSON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY 127-53 (1988); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination:
Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 643-45 (1984).
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on the Lawof Treaties 142 and again in its draft articles on state responsi-
bility.143 The Restatement of Foreign Relations also takes this position."
44
Although Schwelb expressed some doubt on this question in 1961,145
writers generally endorsing the jus cogens status of the prohibition
against genocide include Brownlie,' 46 Parker and Neylon, 147 Paust148 and
Whiteman.149 Hannikainen also agrees, though again noting that states
have not in practice acted to prevent or punish acts of genocide. 5°
A third set of norms arguably of jus cogens status are those forbid-
ding grave breaches of humanitarian law or crimes against humanity.
Brownlie'5 ' and Whiteman 52 accept this, as does Hannikainen with
respect to direct attacks against civilians in internal as well as interna-
tional armed conflicts'
53
A fourth norm relevant to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
possibly of jus cogens status is the right to self-determination. However,
its character is more controversial than the other three sets of norms dis-
cussed in this section. Although the ILC's commentary on the Vienna
Convention could be read as implying that interference with self-deter-
mination was a violation of a jus cogens norm, 54 and its 1976 report on
its draft articles on state responsibility labelled interference with the right
to self-determination an international crime, 155 some writers are more
cautious. Crawford labels the idea that self-determination is a matter of
jus cogens as "difficult to accept."'' 56 Hannikainen, after a lengthy analy-
sis, is prepared to acknowledge that self-determination involves a pe-
remptory norm only as applied to "colonial-type domination.'
' 57
Whiteman omits self-determination from her lengthy list of peremptory
norms. 1 8 Brownlie, however, categorizes self-determination as a matter
142. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 86, at 248.
143. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 113, at 102-04.
144. RESTATEMENT, supra note 112, §702(a) and cmt. n.
145. Schwelb, supra note 131, at 953-56.
146. Brownlie, supra note 54, at 513.
147. Parker and Neylon, supra note 114, at 430-31.
148. Jordan J. Paust, Peace-Making and Security Council Powers: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Raises International and Constitutional Questions, 19 S. ILL. U. L. J. 131, 139 (1994).
149. Whiteman, supra note 138, at 625.
150. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 456-66.
151. Brownlie, supra note 54, at 513.
152. Whiteman, supra note 138, at 626.
153. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 685.
154. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 86, at 248.
155. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 113, at 102-06.
156. CRAWFORD, supra note 136, at 81.
157. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 424. See generally id. at 357-424.
158. Whiteman, supra note 138, at 625-26.
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of jus cogens.159 In short, there is authority both for and against the
proposition that the list of jus cogens norms includes the right of self-
determination.
To conclude this section, it can be said that both the concept and the
content of jus cogens have long enjoyed the attention of international
lawyers. The next stage of the analysis is to critically examine jus cogens
concepts, both generally and as they relate to the fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
III. CRITIQUE OF JUS COGENS
This portion of the discussion will seek to demonstrate that the con-
cept of jus cogens is both intellectually incoherent and of doubtful utility
in international relations. It will first consider certain general problems
with the idea of jus cogens and then examine more particular difficulties
illustrated by the consequences of taking the concept seriously in con-
nection with the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
A. General Critique of Jus Cogens
As should be clear by this point in this article, any consideration of
the concept of jus cogens is necessarily rather complex. To ease under-
standing of this portion of the discussion, it will be divided into three
parts. The first part will briefly demonstrate that the analogy between the
domestic law concept of public policy and the corresponding concept of
jus cogens in international law, upon which the original arguments in
favor of an international jus cogens were based, is fundamentally flawed.
The second section will consider the implications of the difficulty in
specifying the content of jus cogens, arguing that this problem reveals
fundamental theoretical and practical problems with the concept. The last
portion of the discussion will attempt to show that considering the
concept of an international jus cogens in light of reasonable criteria of
legitimacy exposes both theoretical problems and practical difficulties.
Taken together, it is hoped that the parts of this analysis will show that
the concept of jus cogens can neither make any sense nor serve any
useful purpose in the international legal system, though it offers the
potential for doing considerable harm.
159. Brownlie, supra note 54, at 513.
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1. Jus Cogens and Public Policy
As noted above, the concept of public policy in domestic law appar-
ently played a role in suggesting to Verdross' 60 and to the special
rapporteurs on the law of treaties from Lauterpacht through Waldock
161
that a similar concept must necessarily exist in public international law.
Since the domestic law idea apparently contributed to the formulation of
the international law concept, it seems important to consider the solidity
of the connection between the two.
In fact, there are significant problems with seeking to transfer the
idea of public policy as used in domestic legal systems to the interna-
tional arena. At the outset, it is crucial to make clear that what is meant
by public policy in this context is a body of law not susceptible to
modification by the subjects of the legal system in question. The parallel
in the international system would be a set of rules which states could not
alter even by general multilateral treaty, rules intended to limit the
freedom of states in exactly the same way. that public policy notions limit
the freedom of individuals in domestic legal systems. In other words, this
is the concept of public policy which Lauterpacht sought to apply to the
law of treaties.161 It thus must be distinguished from the concept of jus
cogens finally adopted in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which, as noted above 163 and as Sztucki has stressed,' 64 was crafted to
depend entirely on acceptance by states.
This notion of ajus cogens not dependent upon the will of states has
drawn telling scholarly criticism. Schwarzenberger argued as early as
1965 that the international legal system was simply too underdeveloped
to support any non-consensualjus cogens concept.165 Sztucki also pointed
out, over twenty years ago, problems in applying any analogue to the
idea of domestic public policy in international law. For one thing, he
noted, in a domestic legal system the courts can provide a single author-
itative view of the public policy of the system; in the international
system, in contrast, the degree of centralization is less than in any
developed domestic legal system, with no single institution's view of
public policy being determinative. Sztucki also stressed the importance,
for the establishment of any jus cogens regime, of the existence of an
160. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
164. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 97-98.
165. Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEx. L. REv. 455, 476
(1965).
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institution capable of enforcing, as well as announcing, jus cogens norms,
and the non-existence of any such institution in the international system.
Further, he noted, jurisdiction in domestic legal systems is non-consensu-
al, such that individuals are bound to accept a court's view of public
policy regardless of their own preferences; the same situation, obviously,
does not obtain internationally. In the international system, indeed, the
usual mode of resolving a dispute will be negotiation between the parties,
in light of the uncertain availability of a tribunal."6 Christenson adds to
Sztucki's points an additional important observation: that in domestic
systems, an individual who wishes to enforce his rights has no alternative
but to turn to the courts, and thus to accept their views of public policy.
In the international system, in contrast, states have available a broad
array of self-help remedies, and thus do not require the aid of a tribunal
in order to defend their rights; correspondingly, they can be less con-
cerned as to a tribunal's views of public policy.
67
One other key difference between the international legal system and
domestic legal systems also renders suspect any international analogue to
domestic systems' broad public. policy concepts. The domestic system
addresses individuals. The fact that particular rules of public policy may
work difficulties for particular individuals will not necessarily create
corresponding difficulties for society, since hardship to some individuals
would presumably be outweighed by the gains to others brought about
through enforcing whatever policy would be. in question. Even with
respect to the harshest instrument of public policy, the criminal law, the
cost to society of treating criminals as violators of public, policy is
relatively modest. It is certainly feasible to employ police forces, estab-
lish criminal justice systems, and build prisons. Nor is the social cost of
plucking criminals out of society and confining them in prison typically
very great. While there may be hardship to criminals' families, criminals
can usually be replaced in their other social roles by other people.
The international legal system, however, deals primarily with states.
To the extent that enforcing a jus cogens rule against a particular state
does significant harm to that state, the calculus of costs to international
society is different from the corresponding domestic situation. If a state
is weakened by application of a jus cogens rule, the consequences may
spill over and affect other states. States, unlike individuals, cannot easily
166. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 8 n.24, 8-9, 162, 190-91. While it is of course true that
many domestic disputes with public policy overtones are in fact resolved by negotiation
between the parties, Sztucki's observation remains valid, since such bargaining in domestic
systems must necessarily take into account the likely outcome of a judicial resolution of the
dispute, given the reality of the courts' compulsory jurisdiction. It would be surprising if the
views of international courts, with their consensual jurisdiction, had a similar influence upon
international negotiation.
167. Christenson, supra note 109, at 600.
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be replaced in the roles they play in international society.. Thus, to. the
extent that the concept of an unwaivable public policy would require in
a given case some action harmful to a particular state, the costs to
international society might well be considerably greater than would the
corresponding costs of applying a rule of public policy domestically.
It is clear, then, that the genesis of the jus cogens concept rests on
what must be considered fundamental intellectual confusion. It is derived
from rules limiting the freedom of subjects of law in legal systems in
which the authority to determine such rules is undisputed; the subjects of
law cannot escape the courts' control; these subjects have in any case
considerable incentive to submit themselves to the rules applied by the
courts; and the negative social consequences of compelling any single
subject of the law to conform to public policy rules will almost always
be modest.. The concept is to be applied, however, in an international
system in which none of those circumstances are present. Given these
crucial differences, there is considerable reason to question the possibility
of the international legal system applying this concept as its analogue is
applied in domestic law. The next portions of this discussion will address
particular aspects of the problems raised by this attempt at intellectual
borrowing.
2. The Content of Jus Cogens
Considering the issue of the content of jus cogens illustrates both the
theoretical chaos of that doctrine and its capacity for practical harm.
As pointed out in Section IIB, ideas as to the content of jus cogens
have changed over time. Some of those put forward by Verdross would
probably not be seen as enjoying jus cogens status today. Even with
respect to the small number of putative jus cogens norms discussed in
Section II.B as potentially relevant to this article, there has been change
in a relatively brief period. Thus, Hannikainen's exhaustive study of the
-actual status of particular jus cogens norms leads him to conclude that
the right of self-determination can be seen as a matter of jus cogens only
in a severely qualified way, and other writers have expressed doubt as to
self-determination's jus cogens status in any sense. 6 ' Yet self-determina-
tion figured in the ILC's commentary on draft Article 50169 and was
mentioned as an example of a jus cogens norm by a significant number
of delegations to the Vienna Conference.' 70 Further, some writers are
offering qualifications to the reach of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter not
168. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
169. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 86, at 248.
170. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 119.
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mentioned when that article was treated by the ILC and the Vienna
Conference as the most prominent example'of a jus cogens norm. 7'
But more significant than this disagreement over the precise standing
of particular norms; is the more fundamental disagreement discussed
above,'7 2 regarding the source of those norms. When scholars cannot
agree as to whether jus cogens norms are to be derived from positive law
or are, instead, emanations of natural law, there is reason to question
whether there is even a core understanding of the concept. Indeed, it
would seem fair to conclude that there is no such understanding, since,
as will be demonstrated below, there are in fact two incompatible ver-
sions of jus cogens current in international law, their incompatibility
apparently not being clear to many writers in the field. 73 It is diffcult to
accept the proposition that a concept can be seen as a legal rule when its
content is so vague as to permit so great a degree of confusion.
This conclusion is reinforced when it is realized that individual
scholars apparently cannot apply their individual approaches to the
subject consistently. For example, Hannikainen describes the process of
formation of rules of customary international law, including customary
rules with the character of jus cogens, as requiring state practice consis-
tent with the norm in question; he is prepared to reduce the degree of
state practice required with respect to rules also embodied in resolutions
of international organizations, but he insists that the practice requirement
cannot be eliminated. 74 However, he appears to abandon his own insis-
tence on state practice when he examines the jus cogens status of partic-
ular norms. Thus, with. respect to genocide, he notes that there has been
strikingly little state practice involving actions by states either to prevent
particular acts of genocide, or to punish the perpetrators of genocide after
the fact, or even to condemn individual cases of genocide. 75 Yet he
asserts:
However, it is evident that the international community of States
has so unequivocally prescribed the absolute obligation of States not
to resort to genocide under any circumstances whatsoever that the
deficiences in reaction in actual cases do not deprive the prohibition
of genocide of its peremptory character. 1
76
171. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
174. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 236-37.
175. Id. at 464.
176. Id.
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Further, he concludes:
It can be concluded that the international community of States has
been inactive in determining, whether acts of genocide have taken
place, and in condemning acts of genocide... However, there is no
evidence that the UN would have accepted the lawfulness of geno-
cide itself in any specific circumstance. The prohibition of genocide
is peremptory in principle but the functioning of that prohibition in
the practice of the UN is at present limited.'77
Hannikainen's conclusion is very hard to understand, given his own
stated insistence on state practice as a basis for customary law jus cogens
rules. Aside from his questionable reliance on the practice of the United
Nations, in violation of his own insistence on a focus upon the practice
of states, he seems to be saying that a rule is of jus cogens status even
though states have in practice shown themselves unwilling to enforce it.
His statement that "[t]here is no evidence that the UN would have
accepted the lawfulness of genocide itself. . ." is hardly relevant, since
the issue is whether the international community has demonstrated in
practice that genocide is not to be permitted, not whether that community
has indicated affirmative approval of genocide. And it is not clear what
is meant by characterizing a rule as "peremptory in principle" but func-
tioning at only a limited level in practice. Law is applied in individual
cases; if in fact a rule is seldom or never applied in a concrete case, what
can it mean to say that it is "in principle" obligatory in every case?
Of course, Hannikainen is only one writer, but the difficulties in
following his arguments reinforce the impression that the whole subject
of the theory of determining the content of jus cogens is hopelessly
confused. Writers do not merely disagree with one another over the most
fundamental aspects of the question; they even disagree with themselves.
In addition to this problem, however, there is another, going not so
much to the intellectual confusion surrounding the jus cogens concept as
to its utility. That problem is that none of the methods urged as a means
of establishing a norm's jus cogens character is a very good way of
deciding that a particular norm should be non-derogable, that is, that it
must be applied in all cases in which it is implicated.
One would hope that the determination that a particular rule should
be applied as rigidly as the jus cogens concept requires would pass
through a number of stages. First, it would be necessary to attempt to
foresee as broad a range as possible of the circumstances in which the
proposed rule could apply. It would next be necessary to gather a wealth
of information about each of those sets of circumstances, in order to
177. Id. at 466.
Fall 1995]
Michigan Journal of International Law
identify and evaluate the costs and benefits of applying the rule in
particular contexts. No decision as to the status of the rule would take
place until after this evaluation had been completed. In particular, it
would be crucial to keep in mind that each state fills many roles in the
international system, and that the consequence of applying a rule rigidly
to a state in one situation may affect its willingness and ability to act in
other situations, possibly to the detriment of the system generally.. ,
Instead of a process like that described, however, international law
offers two others as means of determining the content of jus cogens.
They are, as suggested above, either a focus upon positive acts of states,
or reliance upon natural law. While they differ fundamentally fromeach
other, neither would permit the sort of careful weighing of alternatives
that would seem necessary when what is being considered is making a
particular rule unwaivable.
The problem with reliance on positive acts of states is that this
inquiry must necessarily depend on state practice, since practice not only
determines the content of customary international law but, as a practical
matter, controls the meaning and application of treaties as well. And
reliance on state practice to determine rules of jus cogens is necessarily
undesirable. Even if practice were unambiguous, which would be uncom-
mon, prominent instances of practice may be inapposite. For example,
Crawford argues that the Allies' reestablishment after World War II. of
states annexed by Germany and Italy prior to September, 1939, supports
the proposition that an illegal annexation cannot extinguish a state's
existence.178 Yet one may question whether the treatment accorded the
subjugated Axis powers would provide very good guidance in evaluating
the status of an arguably illegal annexation carried out by a state which
had not been completely defeated in war.
Reliance on natural law-derived jus cogens raises a different set of
problems. For one thing, such an approach, exemplified by Verdross'
reliance on "the ethics of a particular community" as a source of jus
cogens rules, 179 risks falling into the error of assuming that,.if it would
be a good thing for subjects of a legal system to refrain from particular
behavior, it must make sense -to render the behavior illegal. This does
not, however, follow. If, the behavior is rendered illegal, it will become
necessary to determine how to deal with subjects of the legal system who
engage in the behavior anyway. And it could easily happen that, for a
variety of reasons, treating those engaging in the behavior as lawbreakers
would be so costly as to outweigh any benefits realized by adoption of
178. CRAWFORD, supra note 136, at 418-19.
179. Verdross, supra note 59, at 576.
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the legal rule. One example that comes to mind is the decidedly mixed
experience of Prohibition in the United States in the 1920's.180
A second problem with a natural law approach to jus cogens-making
from the perspective of the quality of the resulting rules is that, as a
practical matter, such an approach could turn out in practice to be court-
centered. Consideration of the moral criteria appropriate to a natural law
analysis is closer to the function of courts than to that of any other
international institution. Courts, however, are not equipped to make the
policy judgments described above. Indeed, any institution capable of
carrying out the sort of policy-making described above is not a court at
all, but a particularly skillful legislature.
Thus, whether one considers an approach centered in the practice of
states or one grounded in natural law, the conclusion is the same. It
seems most unlikely that either process would permit the sort of system-
atic analysis of the actual operation of a proposed rule that would seem
essential if the community is to have confidence that permitting no
derogation from a particular rule would, overall, do more good than
harm.
It thus appears that there is reason to doubt the existence of theoreti-
cal criteria sufficiently precise to identify jus cogens norms. Nor is there
any reason to believe that any of the suggested means of determining the
content of jus cogens would necessarily produce norms whose applica-
tion would in practice produce benefits that would outweigh the costs
which inhere in applying any legal rule to those who choose to disobey
it. And of course, other problems follow from these. For example,
suppose that it were somehow possible to settle upon an agreed means of
identifying jus cogens norms, and it was determined that particular rules
enjoyed that status. It is certainly possible that various of these norms
could point to opposite conclusions in a particular question of interna-
tional relations.' Yet the difficulties described above would not only
make the initial identification of the content of jus cogens problematic.
It would also preclude, as a practical matter, establishing a hierarchy of
jus cogens norms, indicating which of two or more competing norms
should, in a particular case, give way. Absent such a hierarchy, however,
the jus cogens character of the competing norms would exacerbate the
confusion by arguably rendering any possible resolution illegal.
It can be said, then, that considering the aspects of the difficulties in
fixing the content- of jus cogens provides evidence of the theoretical
incoherence of the doctrine, as well as of its limited practical utility. In
180. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 20-35, 199-202 (1979).
181. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 109, at 616-19 (demonstrating that norms are often
used to support different substantive propositions).
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the next portion of the discussion, consideration of the legitimacy of the
jus cogens concept indicates further theoretical and practical concerns.
3. The Legitimacy of Jus Cogens
Professor Franck has offered a two-part definition of "legitimacy" as:
"a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull
towards compliance on those addressed normatively"' 182 and also "the
perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that
that rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance
with generally accepted principles of right process."' 3 Necessarily the
two parts of the definition are related, since if a rule is not perceived as
satisfying the second part, the likelihood that it will satisfy the first part
is reduced. 8 4 In light of this consideration, it is a telling weakness of the
concept of jus-cogens that the theoretical basis for the claim that the
concept is a legitimate part of the international legal system is fundamen-
tally confused. Further, as will be demonstrated below,'85 the mechanism
most often suggested for identifying the content of the concept likewise
seems to be of doubtful legitimacy in this context.
Considering the theoretical issue first, the problem is simply that the
term "jus cogens" is applied in international law to two quite different,
indeed contradictory concepts, one having much firmer legal standing
than the other. Yet arguments depending on employment of jus cogens
treat the two as either identical or, at least, complementary, and seek to
transfer the claim to authority of the more firmly based concept to its
much more shakily-grounded competitor.
To understand the foregoing assertions, it is helpful to recall that the
formulation of the jus cogens concept adopted in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties was a departure from the approach to the issue
previously taken by the ILC's special rapporteurs. 86 As both Rozakis and
Sztucki have pointed out, 187 the concept of peremptory norms developed
prior to the Vienna Conference - which will be labelled for convenience
"Verdrossian jus cogens" - did not make a given norm's status as jus
cogens dependent on the views of states. Rather, the status of a norm
was a function of its object, and states could not alter jus cogens norms.
Lauterpacht's comments on his draft Article 15 make this explicit.
Indeed, he apparently took for granted the inability of states to alter
182. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990).
183. Id. at 19.
184. Id. at 15-19.
185. See infra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
187. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 97-98, 103-05; Rozakis, supra note 104, at 52-53.
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peremptory norms, even those which had become outmoded, and saw
that situation as a problem requiring attention.'88
The language of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, on the other
hand, is unequivocal: a norm's jus. cogens character depends on accep-
tance by states. 189 Further, in its commentary to its draft Article 50, the
ILC observed that changes in jus cogens rules would "most probably be
effected through a general multilateral treaty."''",This phrasing is signifi-
cant in two respects. First, it may be that Sztucki went too far in charac-
terizing the concept of jus cogens as "virtually meaningless"' 9' if it could
be "validly modified by [general multilateral] treaties, instead of estab-
lishing limits for their validity"' 9' since this concept could still operate
with respect to treaties with small numbers of parties. Yet, he is certainly
correct to assert that, if a rule can be modified by general multilateral
treaty, its capacity to limit the freedom of states is not very great. This
conclusion is reinforced if one considers the emphasized language in the
quotation above. It implies that conclusion of a general multilateral treaty
would not necessarily be the only means of altering jus cogens rules,
suggesting that such rules could perhaps be altered by changes in cus-
tomary international law as well. This appears to be Rozakis' view when
he argues that if a rule ceases to satisfy Article 53's criteria, it ceases to
be a jus cogens norm.' 93 He holds to this view even with respect to a
new legal situation not embodied in a new jus cogens norm, despite the
language of Article 53 permitting modification of a jus cogens norm
"only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character."
Article 53 jus cogens also differs from its Verdrossian counterpart in
another important respect: the scope of standing to apply the doctrine.
Verdross' references to the "ethics of the international community,"'194 his
reference in later writing to "the higher interest of the whole international
community"'195 and Lauterpacht's use of the term "international public
policy"' 96 at least imply that the interests embodied in jus cogens rules
are those of the international community, not simply those of individual
states. Modern writers certainly argue that proper application of the jus
188. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
189. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 53.
190. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 86, at 248 (emphasis added).
191. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 111.
192. Id.
193. ROZAKIS, supra note 104, at 88-93.
194. Verdross, supra note 59, at 572.
195. Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 55, 58 (1966).
196. Lauterpacht, supra note 73, at 155.
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cogens concept requires that all states be able to invoke it, not simply
those directly affected by the breach of ajus cogens obligation. 197 Yet, as
noted above, 98 the Vienna Convention limits the right to assert a treaty's
violation of a jus cogens norm to states themselves parties to the treaty.
It applies the label jus cogens, that is, to a right available only to states
particularly affected by some act contrary to some jus cogens rule, not to
states generally.
Thus, there are two.concepts, each called "jus cogens." One embod-
ies a content not dependent on the will of states and presumably can be
invoked by any state. The content of the other depends entirely on state
acceptance; it can, moreover, be invoked only by states particularly
affected by the breach of some element of its content. Clearly, the reach
of these two doctrines would be vastly different. Indeed, it seems that the
two concepts can hardly co-exist. States are either controlled by rules
they cannot change, or they are not. This point - that the two concepts
are incompatible - is of fundamental importance, since they are by no
means equally authoritative in international law.
As Hannikainen has pointed out, it is the Article 53 version that has
been put forward as the proper characterization of jus cogens in interna-
tional legal doctrine. 199 As noted above, the definition has been accepted
by a significant number of states which adhered to the Vienna Conven-
tion and the ILC which relied upon it in drafting the Convention on
International Organization Treaties; the definition was in fact adopted in
that relatively recent Convention. 200 The Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions Law also treats Article 53 as authoritative. 20' It seems impossible,
therefore, to challenge the argument that the Article 53 definition has
achieved firm international acceptance and, correspondingly, has a solid
claim to doctrinal legitimacy.
If, however, jus cogens in international legal doctrine means Article
53 jus cogens, and if Article 53 jus cogens is incompatible with
Verdrossian jus cogens, it is very hard to understand any claim that
Verdrossian jus cogens is also part of international legal doctrine. If it
were, it would effectively nullify Article 53 jus cogens, the standing of
which seems indisputable. Certainly, nothing comparable to the clear
indications of acceptance of Article 53 jus cogens can be offered to
fortify the status of Verdrossian jus cogens.
197. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 269-77; Rozakis, supra note 104 at 191-92.
198. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
199. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 57, at 3.
200. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
201. RESTATEMENT, supra note 112, § 331 cmt. e.
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As important as this point is, however, it is apparently not well
understood, and has produced considerable confusion. Indeed, even
writers whose arguments depend on Verdrossian jus cogens place great
weight on international acceptance of Article 53 jus cogens to justify
their positions, apparently unaware of the incompatibility of the two
doctrines.2" Others, while making no reference to Article 53, refer to jus
cogens rules as those able to constrain the most powerful states, yet
define those rules by reference to their actual implementation.2 °3 Yet, to
focus on implementation is to focus on the actual behavior of states,
which is relevant under Article 53, but not if one applies a Verdrossian
concept. Similarly, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law and some
writers have taken the position that jus cogens can control the content of
customary international law.2°4 Such an assertion would make sense if
what was at issue was Verdrossian jus cogens, as carried forward in
Lauterpacht's original formulation and in the writings of those scholars
who look to natural law as the source of jus cogens. °5 This follows
because the content of Verdrossian jus cogens is independent of the
consent, and therefore, presumably, of the practice of states. The version
of jus cogens embodied in Article 53, however, makes state acceptance
the only test of jus cogens. If this view is correct, there is no higher
authority in international law than the consensus of states. Under this
latter view of jus cogens, it is a contradiction in terms to refer to jus
cogens as controlling customary international law. This follows, since to
assert that jus cogens controls customary international law is to assert
that changes in the general practice of states cannot affect the legal status
of those rules of customary international law of jus cogens status. But
such a development is logically impossible with respect to Article 53 jus
cogens, since it would require that a rule which ex hypothesi did not
represent the general practice of states was nonetheless "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole."
202. See Christopher A. Ford, Adjudicating Jus Cogens, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145, 146-49
(1994); Craig Scott et al., A Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning
the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United Nations Security Council's Arms Embargo on
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 22-24 (1994).
203. Compare Christenson, supra note 109, at 608 (characterizing "an effectivejus cogens
decision" as one in which the decision-maker "must decide effectively ... that sovereign
nation-states, no matter how powerful, may not agree to defect from a peremptory norm") with
id. at 645-46 (asserting that the content of jus cogens would depend on the identity of the
decision-makers who acquired power sufficient to impose their view of jus cogens on the
world).
204. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
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Again, some writers have argued that jus cogens provides a basis for
judicial review of the Security Council.2°6 This argument also must
depend on Verdrossian jus cogens, rather than on the Article 53 version.
After all, the fact that the Council takes an action necessarily signifies
that the states making up the Council do not believe that action violates
a rule "from which no derogation is permitted." And if the members of
the Security Council do not so characterize the action, it can hardly be
said that "the international community as a whole" sees the matter
differently - to argue otherwise is to suggest that one can exclude the
Security Council's membership from the international community as a
whole.
It thus seems clear that, as a theoretical matter, the only version of
jus cogens with a plausible claim to legitimacy within the international
community is a very limited one. The version of jus cogens which
supports the broadest claims for the effect of that doctrine not only
contradicts the version whose legitimacy is established, but it also can
point to no comparable basis for its own legitimacy. The lack of under-
standing of this point reinforces the incoherence of international jus
cogens created by the falseness of the domestic law analogy which gave
birth to the intellectual concept. This is especially true in light of writers'
continued reliance on Verdrossian jus cogens, for example, with respect
to arguments asserting that jus cogens can prevent change in customary
international law or place limits on the authority of the Security Council.
The legitimacy problems of jus cogens are not limited to the theoret-
ical level, however. One must also consider the legitimacy of the claim
of any institution which asserts the authority to determine the content of
jus cogens. First, it must be stressed that this issue of institutional legiti-
macy cannot be avoided, since institutions must necessarily be involved
in determining the content of jus cogens. That is, one cannot hope to
avoid reliance on institutional creation of jus cogens norms by, for
example, reference to natural law concepts, perhaps characterized as
"necessary" elements of the international legal system. This follows
because, as Professor Rubin has observed, natural law concepts can make
themselves felt only if relied upon by particular human decision makers
in concrete cases - yet if so relied upon, those concepts control any
subsequent decisions because of the choice of the decision maker to rely
upon them. Even if the decision maker characterizes the decision she
reaches as compelled by natural law, the decision has consequences
because she is in a position to make decisions which cannot be ignored,
206. Paust, supra note 148, at 138-40; Scott et al., supra note 202, at 85-90; Geoffrey R.
Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1993).
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not because natural law somehow automatically binds the decision-
maker.27 And one can hardly treat reliance on the "necessity" of some
element to a particular legal system as dictating particular non-derogable
rules of that system unless there is widespread agreement on a carefully
defined hierarchy of systemic goals2"8 - again, a situation which can
hardly be self-creating.
We are thrown back, then, on institutions to determine the content of
non-consensual rules of international jus cogens. But there are none. To
be sure, the Security Council of the United Nations is empowered to
make decisions binding, as a practical matter, on all states respecting
certain aspects of international relations,2°9 but it is a political rather than
a legislative body, organized to deal with particular crises rather than to
formulate general policies. Further, since its competence to issue binding
decisions is limited to matters which arguably threaten international
peace and security,210 there are broad areas of international relations as to
which it is not authorized to act.
In any case, the Security Council is not commonly recommended as
the arbiter of jus cogens. Rather, that position is granted to international
tribunals, in particular the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It will be
recalled that Lauterpacht's original draft article on illegal treaties made
the voidness of such treaties dependent on a declaration to that effect by
the ICJ.2" Further, the method finally chosen by the Vienna Conference
on the Law of Treaties to resolve disputes between states overjus cogens
was that of compulsory jurisdiction in the ICJ. 212 Indeed, as noted above,
some writers have gone so far as to suggest that the ICJ has the authority
to enforce jus cogens rules even against the Security Council.
2'3
One must question, however, the legitimacy of any claim that the ICJ
or other international tribunals may properly define the content of jus
cogens. The legitimacy problem in this context can, again in Professor
Franck's terminology, be characterized as lack of "pedigree," that is, the
lack of "authenticated status."2 4 In other words, states do not perceive
international tribunals as generally authorized by their status to compel
them to act in ways they do not wish to act.
207. Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of International Law, 34 HARV. J. INT'L L.
149, 149-50 (1993).
208. Christenson, supra note 109, at 587 n.8.
209. U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII.
210. Id.
211. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
212. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 66.
213. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
214. Id. at 94.
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To take the ICJ as the prime example, this lack of status is manifest-
ed in two distinct ways. The first is the extremely limited character of
the ICJ's authority as defined by its Statute. Only states may be parties
to cases in which it renders binding decisions.215 Its jurisdiction over
states is purely consensual; even its so-called compulsory jurisdiction
depends on a state's (revocable) acceptance of that jurisdiction.21 6 Its
decisions are binding only with respect to the case before it; they do not
establish rules of law through stare decisis.1 7 The ICJ is empowered
only to apply, not to make, law.218 This last point is particularly signifi-
cant if what is to be considered is Verdrossian jus cogens, so that a court
announcing the existence of such a rule would not simply be relying on
the general acceptance of the rule by states, but rather on its own views
of the needs of the international system. Finally, the ICJ's judgments are
enforceable only by and at the discretion of the Security Council. 1 9
The drafters of the ICJ's Statute have thus created a "court" which
can neither claim jurisdiction over states against their wills nor enforce
its judgments against states who have submitted to its jurisdiction. The
ICJ, therefore, is not trusted by the states which established it to exercise
any significant degree of power. This effective refusal to permit the ICJ
to act against non-consenting states simply cannot be squared with an
effort to portray the ICJ as authorized to establish non-derogable rules of
international law. (Of course, the ICJ's authority to hear cases arising
under Article 66 of the Vienna Convention is not here in question,2
firmly based as it is on state consent. But since only 76 states are parties
to the Vienna Convention - at a time when the membership of the
United Nations exceeds 180221 - Article 66 provides only limited
justification for any claim of general authority in the ICJ to determine
the content of jus cogens).
Aside from formal indications that the ICJ's legitimate authority is
perceived by states as extremely limited, there are practical reasons to
doubt the legitimacy of any effort by the ICJ to claim authority to
determine the content of jus cogens. One is that states do not use the ICJ
215. STATUTE OF.THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, 2.
216. Id., art. 34.
217. Id., art. 59.
218. Id., art. 38.
219. U.N. CHARTER, art. 96, 2. Given all these factors, one must seriously consider
Sztucki's suggestion that Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, by
essentially asking the ICJ to make general declarations as to the content ofjus cogens, calls on
the court to exceed its jurisdiction, Sztucki, supra note 56, at 141-42.
220. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 66.
221. Membership of Principal United Nations Organizations in 1995, 32 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON., Mar. 1995, at inside back cover.
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much. It may be that this fact reflects both the availability of diplomatic
channels for the resolution of particular disputes and the limited avail-
ability of international tribunals, as Sztucki has suggested.222 In any case,
Professors Carter and Trimble were able to record only 69 contentious
cases and 21 advisory cases brought before the ICJ over the period
1945-mid-1993.223 Such a lack of usage certainly raises doubts as to the
degree of respect felt for the ICJ by states.
Furthermore, states ignore the judgments of the ICJ relatively fre-
quently. This phenomonon is common enough that an American federal
court of appeals took note of it, rejecting the argument that an obligation
to obey decisions of the ICJ in the exercise of its compulsory jurisdiction
was "accepted and recognized by the community of states as a whole. 224
All of these observations raise serious questions as to the theoretical
and practical legitimacy of any attempt by the ICJ, and by extension, less
prestigious tribunals, to determine the content of jus cogens. In light of
this conclusion, it is puzzling that writers addressing the subject of jus
cogens pay as much attention to the opinions of international tribunals as
they do. There would seem to be no justification for reliance .on judicial
formulations of jus cogens without some indication that the formulation
has had some impact on international. relations. For example, Christen-
son, in his provocative article on jus cogens, places some weight on two
decisions by the ICJ and one by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, all of which hinted at'relying or squarely relied upon jus
cogens concepts in reaching their results.225 Yet the losing state ignored
the adverse judgments in all three cases, raising doubts as to the signifi-
cance of the tribunals' efforts to fortify their conclusions by reference to
jus cogens.
In summary, then, consideration of the legitimacy of international jus
cogens reinforces the impression of intellectual incoherence and practical
irrelevance. The only version of that doctrine with a plausible claim to
legitimate status has a relatively limited reach - yet claims are made for
a much broader reach of the doctrine. Further, the legitimate authority of
the institution most frequently mentioned as the identifier of jus cogens
norms is itself limited. Its status would not appear to be up to setting
limits on the freedom of states. In light of states' limited willingness to
resort to the ICJ or to abide by its judgments, any court-centered concept
222. SZTUCKI, supra note 56, at 190-91.
223. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 44-47 (1994).
224. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 53).
225. Christenson, supra note 109, at 607-08, 620-23.
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of non-consensual internationaljus cogens can have little practical effect.
Considerations of legitimacy, then, support the conclusion that the jus
cogens concept is weakly justified theoretically and practically irrelevant.
The foregoing sections have offered a general exposition of the
theoretical and practical weaknesses of the concept of jus cogens with
respect to its origins, its content, and the legitimacy of its application.
The next portion of the discussion offers a concrete example of the
practical problems the doctrine can cause.
B. Jus Cogens and Bosnia-Herzegovina
1. Introduction
Preliminarily, it is necessary to make explicit precisely how the
concept of jus cogens affects and is affected by the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Those interconnections take several forms.
First, jus cogens impacts on the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict to the
extent that self-determination is a jus cogens norm, which, it will be
recalled, is controversial. 226 Self-determination is relevant in two ways.
First, as previously discussed, one of Germany's justifications for recog-
nizing Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was derived from the right of self-
determination, and that act of recognition apparently contributed to the
commencement of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.227 That is, there is
some reason to believe that adherence to a norm arguably of jus cogens
character helped start a brutal war. Recognition took place, moreover, in
a context in which no clear gain from that step could be assumed.
The right to self-determination is also relevant to this conflict be-
cause it arguably provides a basis for the territorial claims of the Bosnian
Serbs.22' To be sure, the Arbitration Commission of the EC's Conference
on Yugoslavia rejected those claims,229 but the Commission's opinion
leaves many questions unanswered and fails to address specifically the
question of whether the right to self-determination is of jus cogens status
and, if so, what the consequences of that status ar23
226. See supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
228. See Opinion No. 2, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Jan. 11,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 1497, 1498 (1992) [hereinafter Opinion No. 2]; compare Anderson, supra note
36, at 390-91.
229. Opinion No. 2, supra note 228, at 1498.
230. The relevant paragraph from the Arbitration Commission's opinion reads as follows:
The Commission considers that international law as it currently stands does not
spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination. However, it is well
established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis
juris) except where the States concerned agree otherwise.
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Leaving aside self-determination questions, it seems clear that
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a victim of use of force by a state (the FRY) in
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Since
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a member of the United Nations,23 it necessarily
falls into the class of entities entitled to the protection of Article 2(4).
Since its territorial integrity is threatened by a use of force, given that
armed groups hostile to it control 50% of its land area, and since that use
of force has apparently involved FRY troops and arguably has been at
times controlled by the FRy,23 2 it is at least maintainable that Bosnia-
Herzegovina has been the victim of a violation of Article 2(4). This
violation implicatesjus cogens since Article 2(4) is generally understood,
at least in this context, to be a rule of jus cogens, assuming there are any
such rules.233
Finally, jus cogens is arguably implicated in the context of the
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina with respect to violations of humani-
tarian law. There is clearly evidence that this conflict has been the
occasion for the commission of both genocide and/or grave breaches
of humanitarian law not amounting to genocide, generally by the
Serbs;234 indeed, the Tribunal has indicted the Bosnian Serbs' leaders
Id. at 1498. The Commission went on to suggest that application of the self-determination
principle could require that the Serb populations in Bosnia and Croatia be permitted to choose
their nationalities for themselves.
There are several problems with this opinion. First, as noted in the text of this article, it
does not address the question whether the right of self-determination enjoys the status ofjus
cogens. Second, it is surprising to see a tribunal deal with a legal principle of uncertain content
by simply noting the fact of uncertainty; presumably, if the principle in fact is a rule of law,
it is the tribunal's responsibility to flesh it out. Third, the Commission's determination that uti
possidetisjuris always trumps self-determination does not appear to be well-established. In the
ICJ decision most closely on point, the Court characterized uti possidetis as "a principle of a
general kind" in connection with decolonization; it did not refer to any other circumstance in
which entities may attain the status of independent states. Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565-66 (Dec. 22). Further, in
holding that uti possidetis took precedence over self-determination in that case, the Court
expressly relied on a particular regional practice in Africa, according to which respect for
boundaries existing at independence was seen as a necessity for realizing the practical benefits
of self-determination; the Court did not suggest that this resolution of the conflict between the
two principles would necessarily apply in any other region. Id. at 566-67. Finally, it is by no
means clear what the Commission meant by referring to a right of the Bosnian and Croatian
Serbs to elect their own nationalities. If such a right were recognized, that would mean either
that Bosnia and Croatia would be forced to permit persons of Serbian nationality to remain
within their borders, with all the possible problems such an arrangement could create, or else
that these nationals of Serbia, in order to fully enjoy that status, would have to abandon their
homes in areas that remained parts of Croatia and Bosnia and emigrate to Serbia The potential
difficulties either resolution could pose are obvious.
231. G.A. Res. 46/237, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/237 (1992).
232. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 34-38, 47 and accompanying text.'
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for war crimes.235 Such acts are at least arguably in violation of jus
cogens norms, if any exist.
23 6
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then, seems to have been caused in
part by the application of the concept of self-determination and has seen
apparent violations of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and of
humanitarian law. Respect for self-determination, Article 2(4) and
humanitarian rules are each, arguably, jus cogens rules. The interplay
between these rules and different aspects of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war
illustrates several of the points made in section III.A. For convenience
this portion of the discussion will follow the same organization as that
of Section III.A. First, it will show how the Bosnia-Herzegovina fighting
illustrates problems in applying in international relations a concept
analogous to that of "public policy" in domestic legal systems. Next, the
discussion will show how the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates the
deficiencies in the methods of determining which rules of international
law ought to be non-derogable, in that treatment of the above-mentioned
rules in this fashion arguably has done, or would have done, or will do
more harm than good. Finally, the discussion will demonstrate the
apparent illegitimacy of the idea that particular rules are of a jus cogens
character - and thus force the conclusion that Verdrossian jus cogens
plays no role in international relations.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina and International Public Policy
We first consider, then, the differences between applying public.
policy-like concepts in the international system and applying such
concepts in domestic legal systems. It will be recalled that one problem
in analogizing between the two systems is that such an analogy assumes
that, just as in domestic systems the harm done to individuals by forcing
them to conform to public policy concepts or face the consequences is
outweighed by benefits to the community, so similar harm to states
violating jus cogens is outweighed by the benefits to the international
community of enforcing such rules.
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, provides at least one
example of a situation in which this analogy does not appear to hold. As
noted above, Bosnia-Herzegovina has arguably been the victim of a
violation of Article 2(4) at the hands of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (which may be identified with Serbia). If Article 2(4) had been
treated by the Security Council as absolutely non-derogable, however,
the Council must necessarily have forbidden any peace plan which
235. Simons, supra note 47.
236. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
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deprived the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina of full control of any
territory taken in violation of that article. To have followed that course
would, as a practical matter, have meant that there could be no resolu-
tion of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the Bosnian Serbs either
were militarily defeated or fundamentally changed their attitude toward
the issues that triggered the fighting in the first place. Since the latter
development is not foreseen by any observer, the complete military
defeat of the Bosnian Serbs would be the only way to end the fighting.
However, given the relationship between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs,
at least some of the steps which would have been necessary to inflict
such a defeat could have had severe negative effects on Serbia. Some
Western states have hoped that Serbia would eventually play a signifi-
cant constructive role in the Balkans.237 Indeed, the United States sees
Serbia as very important to the achievement of peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.238 That is, the actual effect of preventing a development
supposedly contrary to "international public policy" would be to harm a
member of the international community whose role in international
relations could not easily be filled by some other entity. The cost to the
international community of abiding by this rule is thus not comparable
to adherence to a rule of public policy in a domestic legal system, in
which harm to an individual through application of a rule of public
policy rarely harms, and generally benefits, the community.
3. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Content of Jus Cogens.
The second general point in Section III.A was. the difficulty of
determining the content of jus cogens. That is, not only was there
disagreement over which rules should be considered of a jus cogens
character, but international relations seemed to offer no mechanism for
deciding objectively what rules should be on the list. The war in Bosnia-
Herezegovina illustrates both problems.
The Bosnian Serbs' claims to self-determination are an example of
the uncertain content of the list of jus cogens norms. Thus, twenty-six
years after the ILC more or less implied that the right to self-determi-
nation was a matter of jus cogens and sixteen years after the ILC's draft
articles on state responsibility labelled denial of self-determination an
international crime, the EC's Arbitration Commission could still assert
that international law did not "spell out all the implications of the right
237. Mark M. Nelson et al., Vicious Circle: The Saber Rattling Over Bosnia Sounds Like
a Bleak Reply, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1995, at AI, A4.
238. Stephen Engelberg, Tribunal Asks U.S. for Pledge on War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1995, at Al.
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to self-determination" and also experienced great difficulty reconciling
that principle with the principle of uti possidetis juris.239
This point is also reflected in at least one reaction to the exclusion
from the Tribunal's jurisdiction of the offense of committing an unlaw-
ful use of force. As explained above, it is at least arguable that Bosnia-
Herzegovina has suffered just such an unlawful use of force, and, ac-
cording to doctrine, the jus cogens status of the prohibition on aggres-
sion is clear. Nonetheless, one commentator has expressed approval of
omitting "crimes against peace" from the Tribunal's Statute, arguing that
including jurisdiction over such acts "would almost inevitably require
the tribunal to investigate the causes of the conflict itself (and the justi-
fications issued by the combatants), which would involve the tribunal
squarely in the political issues surrounding the conflict. ' '240 This explana-
tion is puzzling. It is difficult to imagine any situation in which a tribu-
nal was adjudicating a charge of unlawful aggression in which the tribu-
nal would be able to avoid "investigat[ing] the causes of the conflict...
and the justifications of the combatants." If this argument against the
Tribunal's jurisdiction over the offense of aggression is meant to suggest
that such inquiries are so inevitably political that no legal standard could
be applied to them, it amounts to saying that "aggression" is too vague
a term ever to be applied by a court. If that is what this statement
means, it reinforces the argument that the concept of jus cogens is too
lacking in content to be a legal category and suggests that the writer
does not see violations of Article 2(4) as implicating jus cogens. Alter-
natively, the writer may have meant that the circumstances of this
particular case would render such an inquiry "too political." Again,
however, it is difficult to see what differentiates this case from any other
in which aggression has arguably been committed but the aggressor has
not been subjugated. If the writer means to imply that prosecutions for
aggression should be limited to those cases in which the aggressor is
completely defeated, he obviously narrows the scope of the prohibition
considerably. More importantly for purposes of this discussion, he
implies that applying Article 2(4) according to its letter would make no
sense with respect to acts of aggression which do not culminate in the
subjugation of the aggressor. He thus in effect argues that, if the jus
cogens "process" has conferred non-derogable status on Article 2(4), it
represents bad policy. If this is his view, the writer appears to be sug-
gesting that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates the second prob-
lem with the content of jus cogens - the contention that both of the
239. Opinion no. 2, supra note 228, at 1498.
240. James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 645 (1993).
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processes suggested as generators of jus cogens are dubious vehicles for
formulating non-waivable rules of law whose benefits will in practice
outweigh their costs.
Certainly, the Bosnia-Herzegovian war would seem to provide
ample illustration of that point. For example, consider the endorsement
by the Security Council and later by the United States of a peace plan
that would, in effect, recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina's loss of territory
due to an arguably unlawful use of force. Quite clearly, the Council
thought that rigid application of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter on these facts was poor policy. This decision is at least com-
prehensible. It will be recalled that the Bosnian Serbs formerly con-
trolled approximately 70%of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the forces of
the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared unlikely to be able to
defeat the Serbs militarily. 24' That meant that the Bosnian Serbs could
not be compelled to disgorge the territory they had conquered unless
third states entered the war. (In fact, of course, it was only the interven-
tion of Croatia in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina that compelled the
Bosnian Serbs to yield a large portion of the territory they controlled).242
Thus, if the Security Council wished to end rather than widen the con-
flict, thereby avoiding as well the risk of a wider war that was part of
243the Council's original concern, some sort of negotiation with the
Bosnian Serbs would be necessary. And if the Council insisted that the
outcome of the negotiations must include the agreement by the Bosnian
Serbs to surrender all the land they had conquered, despite their military
dominance, then presumably the odds that negotiations could succeed
would be quite small. In fact, the plan that is giving some hope of
ending the conflict peacefully permits the Bosnian Serbs to retain a
considerable portion of their conquests.
In short, mechanical acceptance of the absolutely binding character
of Article 2(4) in this situation would necessarily have been perceived at
the time of the adoption of Resolution 942 as leading either to a bigger
war or to a war that could not be ended. Either development, in turn,
could have persisting effects in the Balkans contrary to the interests of
the international community generally. Under such circumstances, it was
surely not unreasonable for the Security Council to conclude that such
an automatic application of Article 2(4) would simply make no sense.
Automatic application would, indeed, appear to contradict the basic
policy behind that article, which presumably aims at the limitation of the
use of force, not at prolonging wars. This is not to say that the policy
241. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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adopted by the Security Council was the only reasonable alternative in
this situation. Certainly, a good case could be made that third states
should have intervened earlier to aid Bosnia-Herzegovina. The point is
not that the Security Council's approach was the only possible approach,
but rather that it was a reasonable approach that would have been abso-
lutely unavailable if the Council had seen itself bound to apply Article
.2(4) to the letter. In other words, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
demonstrates that according jus cogens status to Article 2(4) would be
an exercise in bad law-making, since it would mean that an approach to
ending the fighting in that state that permitted. taking into account a
number of the potential costs and benefits to all those involved would
have been unavailable to the international community.
Again, if the jus cogens "process" can be seen as having conferred
jus cogens status on the rule of self-determination, it is clear that this
process can lead to the non-derogability of rules that arguably should be
derogable. Thus, had Germany been less convinced of the fundamental
character of self-determination, it might have withheld recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia, and Bosnia-Herezegovina might have been spared
thehorrors it has suffered.
The problem presented by the idea of immunizing Bosnian Serb
leaders from war crimes prosecutions as an element of an eventual peace
settlement raises many of these same issues as are presented by the jus
cogens status of Article 2(4). As Professors D'Amato and Forsythe have
observed, it is difficult to imagine the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs
agreeing to any settlement of this conflict which did not immunize them
from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.244 Yet any agreement purporting to
grant such immunity would arguably amount to acquiescence in acts in
violation of jus cogens, and thus itself be void as violative of norms of
jus cogens. This problem, too, raises the specter of jus cogens rules
operating to prolong a war. It also illustrates a defect in the jus cogens
"process" not raised by the Article 2(4) problem: the non-existence of
any method of rationally weighing against one another the policies
embodied in different jus cogens norms. Thus, if the jus cogens goal of
ending inter-state wars is seen as primary, then a concession to particu-
lar leaders necessary to end a war presumably would be consistent with,
if not indeed required by, jus cogens. Conversely, if respect for humani-
tarian norms is primary, then jus cogens would require that the war
continue if it could not be ended except by letting war criminals escape.
Yet acting on this conclusion would in effect prolong the very condi-
244. Anthony A. D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500,
500-03 (1994); David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401, 415-16 (1994).
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tions which produce the commission of war crimes. This dilemma
simply cannot be resolved without determining which of the two jus
cogens goals has priority. But there is no mechanism in jus cogens
doctrine for making such a determination. In this connection, it is strik-
ing that Professor D'Amato's suggestion that it might be impossible to
end the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina without providing immunity
from the Tribunal's jurisdiction for Bosnian Serb leaders245 evoked
extremely negative responses246 - but, as D'Amato observed,24 7 none of
those responses suggested a way of addressing the dilemma D'Amato
identified other than what he proposed.
4. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Legitimacy of Jus Cogens.
The last subject addressed in Section III.A was the doubtful legiti-
macy of at least the Verdrossian version of jus cogens. The war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly illustrates that point. In excluding crimes
against peace from the jurisidiction of the Tribunal,4  and in endorsing
a peace plan calling for the formal limitation of the authority of Bosnia-
Herzegovina over a portion of its territory because of a use of force
against that territory arguably in violation of Article 2(4),49 the Security
Council appears to be derogating from Article 2(4). The same can be
said of the American peace plan.250 Clearly, neither the Security Council
nor the United States individually felt constrained to apply Article 2(4)
rigidly in a situation in which they perceived, correctly or not, that the
consequences of doing so would undermine the basic objective of that
article. They thereby demonstrated that - in Professor Franck's phrase
- the "pull towards compliance, 251 of an absolutist understanding of
Article 2(4), obligatory without regard to the wills of states, was not
great. The actions of the Council and of the United States thus appear to
reinforce the impression that the legal standing of this Verdrossian
version of jus cogens is questionable.
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has also been the occasion for
further demonstration of the intellectual confusion surrounding jus
cogens. Thus, some writers have claimed to rely on jus cogens to attack
245. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
246. See Payam Akhavan, Letter to the Editors in Chief, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1995);
Jordan J. Paust, Letter to the Editors in Chief, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 715 (1994); Benjamin B.
Ferencz, Letter to the Editors in Chief, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 717 (1994).
247. Anthony A. D'Amato, Reply, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1995).
248. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
249. S.C. Res. 942, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/942 (1994). See also
supra discussion at notes 48-49.
250. See supra discussion at note 50.
251. Franck, supra note 182, at 16.
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various Security Council actions relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina as
unlawful because they are contrary to jus cogens.252 But, as discussed
above, such claims make no sense if Article 53 jus cogens is at issue.
This follows since, as noted above, it seems a contradiction in terms to
characterize any action taken by the Security Council as contrary to a
rule accepted and recognized by the community of states as a whole.
Thus, Security Council actions can raise no jus cogens problems unless
'jus cogens" is taken to mean Verdrossian jus cogens. Yet, as also noted
above, Verdrossian jus cogens has very weak claims to legitimacy in
international law, since it is inconsistent with the easily legitimated
Article 53 jus cogens. The fact that some authorities consider jus cogens
relevant in this situation, then, indicates the continuing confusion in
international law over the concept and the failure of many to understand
the extremely limited character of the only version of that idea with any
claim to serious standing in international law.
The crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina also reveals another aspect of the
issue of the legitimacy of jus cogens not previously discussed. To assert
that a state is legally required or forbidden to act in a particular way
necessarily means that the desire of the state to act in some different
way is legally irrelevant. But of course, the "desire" of a state is more
precisely the "desire" of those individuals constituting the government
of the state. And those desires in the cases of governments democratical-
ly selected and responsive to an electorate may well reflect the views of
that electorate. To say that international law in a particular case forbids
a state from acting on its "desires" even when those desires are reflec-
tive of the views of the people of the state is thus to say that rules of
international law take precedence over democratic decision making. That
conclusion in itself is not troubling, since with respect to most issues of
international law there is no reason to treat states' decisions differently
depending on their domestic governmental organization. The Bosnia-
Herzegovina situation suggests a limit on that attitude, however.
This follows because what is at issue, ultimately, is whether third
states should go to war. As has been noted, the Security Council's
concerns in this situation apparently extend beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina
to include the objective of limiting the spread of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.253 But if the achievement of that goal depends on an
end to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if jus cogens forbids
ending that fighting in a way which leaves Bosnia-Herzegovina's territo-
rial integrity infringed by force, then, as discussed above, adherence to
jus cogens norms in this context will require the defeat of the Bosnian
252. See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 202, at 82-90.
253. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Serbs. This could not be accomplished unless third states go to war to
end the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina; even the August-September
1995 territorial losses by the Bosnian Serbs came about only because of
the heavy intervention of Croatian forces in the fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.254
In short, taking jus cogens seriously in this context comes perilously
close to asserting that an obscurely derived doctrine of international law
curtails the freedom of a democratically elected government to respond
to its electorate's desire not to go to war. It seems doubtful, to put it
mildly, that any doctrine of international law should be treated as being
so overwhelmingly authoritative. Yet such a result would seem to be
one implication of treating Article 2(4) as non-derogable in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
To sum up, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates many
of the points made in Part III.A. First, the assumptions underlying the
public policy concept in domestic legal systems are not necessarily
transferrable to the international system. Second, it is in fact a bad idea
to treat as absolutely binding a number of rules thought to enjoy jus
cogens status. Finally, the practice of states in this crisis suggests doubts
about the legitimacy of the jus cogens character of rules normally al-
leged to enjoy that status. It can be said that the events in Bosnia-
Herzegovina show what happens when one contemplates applying jus
*cogens in the actual conduct of international relations: at a great many
levels, it doesn't work.
C. Implications
What are the implications of all this for the concept of jus cogens?
This question is difficult to address, particularly given that idea's dem-
onstrated immunity to modification by experience. Nonetheless, one can
imaagine two possible effects.
First, it is commonplace to describe jus cogens rules as in some way
"overriding" or "fundamental."2 55 Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown that
certain rules commonly thought to enjoy jus cogens status are not
treated by states as fundamental in any recognizable sense. Thus, the
Security Council has been unwilling to use force to protect Bosnia-
Herzegovina from violation of its, rights under Article 2(4). While, as
noted above, this is a perfectly defensible decision, it necessarily implies
that a number of states are prepared to tolerate a violation of Article
2(4). Further, as Anderson has pointed out eloquently, the establishment
254. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 54, at 512-13.
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of the Tribunal, so far from demonstrating that prevention of violations
of humanitarian law is a "fundamental" interest, more closely resembles
window-dressing intended to conceal the failure to take the action that
would have shown the centrality of that interest - intervention to pre-
vent the violations of humanitarian law from taking place.2" 6
Related to the first point is the second: the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is the first situation in which the international community,
to the extent that there is one, has acted formally, to the extent that it
can, to undercut a rule supposed to enjoy jus cogens status. Of course,
there have been many cases in the past in which acts supposed to vio-
late jus cogens evoked no effective international response. In those
cases, however, the violations were simply ignored, or ascribed to Cold
War politics, or allowed to fall from public view after drawing con-
demnatory resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly. In this case,
however, the Security Council did not ignore the situation; it addressed
it, affirmatively supporting a resolution that appears inconsistent with
what is supposed to be the best-established rule of jus cogens, Article
2(4). It did this, moreover, in the absence of the usual alibis - the Cold
War is over.
These developments should force international lawyers to begin to
re-examine the concept of jus cogens. It is by no means clear, however,
that such a re-examination will take place.
IV. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
Christenson has described jus cogens as "surely conceal[ing] sub-
stantive emptiness" '257 and as "a normative myth masking power ar-
rangements that avoid substantive meaning until later decision, thereby
both postponing and inviting political and ideological conflict.""25 Cer-
tainly, this paper suggests that he is right about the concept's substantive
emptiness and avoidance of substantive meaning. What is more difficult
to determine is what role such a concept can play in a legal system.
Of course, any legal system needs some standard against which the
justice of its enactments is evaluated. The difficulty with the concept of
jus cogens is that it purports to be, not a standard for evaluating law,
but law itself.
As law, jus cogens fails. Its content is inevitably uncertain, reflect-
ing intellectual confusion as to the core of the doctrine. Corresponding-
ly, its claim to legitimacy in international law is murky. It is applied as
a characterization to rules which, if treated as though they really were
256. Anderson, supra note 36, at 405 n.56.
257. Christenson, supra note 109, at 590.
258. Id.
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non-derogable, would do more harm than good in many contexts. And
the means most often suggested for determining its content lack both the
authority and the capability to carry out the task.
This article has sought to demonstrate that to the extent that jus
cogens has been applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has done harm, and
when it has not done harm, it is because the concept has not been taken
seriously. Bosnia-Herzegovina further demonstrates the confusion about
the sources, the content, and the scope of application of jus cogens.
Perhaps the concept works well as Christenson's normative myth.
As a part of the international legal system, however, it is a source of
confusion and distraction. Jus cogens should be allowed to go the way
of monism, and fade away.
